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I. INTRODUCTION 
God bless the Socratic Method.  Ever since law schools embraced a 
teaching style that allows professors to answer questions with questions, 
all the while suggesting that we know the answer but would prefer that 
the student discover it themselves, we teachers of American 
Constitutional Law have had a place to hide our own confusion about a 
critical aspect of our constitutional jurisprudence.  That confusion arises 
when we abandon our mother tongues and begin to use the language (let 
us call it “rights-speak”1 for now) the United States Supreme Court uses 
when it tries to identify creatures called “fundamental rights” and 
describe the process by which they were located.  From their 
undergraduate days and their general immersion in pop culture, our 
beloved students are certain that we can conjure up a list of the creatures 
for them and provide a “how-to” manual on finding others that are yet to 
be recognized.  As law professors, we must surely be bilingual in “rights-
speak.” 
But then we try to explain it to them and pained looks appear on their 
faces.  Even those of us whose tenure in this field now approaches the 
three decade mark find ourselves less able to feign the appearance that 
we know the answer to the “rights question” our Constitution poses.  In 
the end, we have to acknowledge that not only is there no fixed list of 
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rights and no analytical template to seek one, but that even a sensible 
starting point to fashion one eludes us.  We are forced to admit that the 
road our current rights analysis has taken us down has turned into a 
thicket through circular reasoning and outcomes validated by arbitrarily 
selected “traditions” of the past masquerading as standards for “rights” in 
a dynamic present.  We end up warning the students to steer clear of the 
area—pointing out that in 2009 the Supreme Court itself cautioned 
against expanding the rights protected by due process since “guideposts 
for responsible decision-making in this unchartered area are scarce and 
open-ended.”2  As the Court is the guidepost maker, this was a sobering 
admission indeed. 
Yet this is not just a problem involving some pedagogical difficulty 
in a law-school classroom.  A thicket is a dangerous place to be when a 
sensible approach to the “rights question” is at issue—for reasons that go 
to the heart of the political world in which we all would like to reside. 
“Rights,” whatever they are made of and however they operate, are 
measures of respect.  Whether the government is required to respect our 
differences by applying laws under the principles of equal protection or 
whether it must simply respect a space in which we are to be left alone, 
rights and individuality are forever linked. 
But as our economy, our culture, and our security become 
increasingly integrated with and systematically dependent upon others 
here and abroad, our worlds seem less and less our own.  Central 
governments claim to be the only entities capable of managing that 
systematic integration but insist that to do so they need to respect us less.  
If the Supreme Court’s approach to the “rights question” remains 
confused, the thicket created will not just undermine the institution of the 
Court.  It will make us all doubt that insisting on respect from the 
government is possible.  So before we lose faith we cannot get back, we 
need a new approach to the “rights question.” 
At the outset, I recognize the enormity of this undertaking.  Kind 
souls who have read a draft of this Article have suggested that treating 
the issue in book length is needed, and I hope that will come.  But, for 
now, treat what you are about to read as an initial expedition into the 
thicket.  My goal is to give context to the problem we face, a sense of 
how we got here, and some inkling about how we may get out of it.  If it 
leaves you interested enough to want more in any area or, better still, 
occasions you to offer comment and critique, I will be honored. 
                                                     
 2. Dist. Att’y’s Office for the Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 2308, 2322 (2009) 
(quoting Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992)). 
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The paper asks three tough questions, the first of which is “where are 
we?”  I will show that once the Supreme Court took on the mantle of 
resolving the “rights question” posed by the Constitution, its doctrines of 
“selective incorporation,” “substantive due process,” and Ninth 
Amendment “penumbral rights” have brought us to a dangerous 
jurisprudential thicket that threatens the very rights it seeks to uphold.  
The second question is “how did we get here?”  This will require some 
brief history regarding the origins and purpose of the Amendments that 
pose the “rights question.”  Finally, the question “where do we go from 
here?” requires that we recognize this simple truth: unless we call for a 
new constitutional convention, the American socio-political order in the 
twenty-first century will be predicated on a charter drafted in the later 
part of the eighteenth.  This does not have to be the anomaly it seems at 
first blush as long as we determine that the old charter contains insight 
about human political nature that makes it continually relevant in our 
age.  To see if it does, we need to understand those who framed it and the 
principles of the intellectual movement that so profoundly affected them.  
“They” were the Framers (primarily, James Madison) and the movement 
was the Scottish Enlightenment. 
One final caution before we begin: I do not believe that the way to 
protect our ability to insist on respect from the government may be found 
merely by a survey of history or a philosophical meditation about issues 
that exist in a pure state only in the rarefied air of the academy.  David 
Hume was right that “[t]he question is not concerning any fine imaginary 
republic, of which a man may form a plan in his closet,”3 or, for that 
matter, in his office at a university.  The success of the very real republic 
we create by interpreting our Constitution will not be measured by the 
degree to which it approximates some theoretical construct or satisfies 
the intellectual elite.  It will succeed only to the degree that it is 
embraced by the group Hume called “‘that middling rank of men, who 
are the best and firmest basis of public liberty.’”4  It is their most 
fundamental assent that any plan must seek. 
The plan that will attain that assent will promise that our political 
world will be a sublime paradox: a government sufficiently empowered 
                                                     
 3. GARRY WILLS, EXPLAINING AMERICA: THE FEDERALIST 13 (1981) (quoting 1 DAVID 
HUME, Whether the British Government Inclines More to Absolute Monarchy, or to a Republic, in 
ESSAYS: MORAL, POLITICAL, AND LITERARY 126 (T.H. Green & T.H. Gross eds., London, 
Longmans, Green, and Co. 1907) (1742) [hereinafter ESSAYS]).  This theme was used by Madison in 
The Federalist Nos. 37 and 56.  Id. 
 4. JAMES BUCHAN, CROWDED WITH GENIUS, THE SCOTTISH ENLIGHTENMENT: EDINBURGH’S 
MOMENT OF THE MIND 86 (HarperCollins Publishers 2003) (quoting DAVID HUME, Of Refinement in 
the Arts, in POLITICAL ESSAYS 112 (1752)). 
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to do the things only a collective entity can do in aid of the common 
good but sufficiently restrained so that individuals are free to pursue the 
spiritual, intellectual, and scientific growth that beings in evolution are 
bound to seek.  Our concept of rights has a vital place in the effort to 
produce this paradox.  By stepping out of the confines of the “rights-
speak” language that has brought us into a dangerous thicket and 
stepping back to examine the origins of a charter in which we invest so 
much faith, we may find an approach to rights that gives them dignity, 
permanence, and, most of all, efficacy.  But no matter what steps we 
ultimately take, there is one thing we must abandon.  Hiding behind the 
Socratic Method is no longer an option. 
II. ACCEPTING THE MANTLE AND THE SEARCH FOR SOURCES 
While the Constitution is not a secret scroll that only the Supreme 
Court may decipher, John Marshall was right that the Supreme Court 
must bear the mantle for giving it authoritative interpretation.  His 
famous passage states: “It is emphatically the province and duty of the 
judicial department to say what the law is.  Those who apply the rule to 
particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule.  If two 
laws conflict with each other, the courts must decide on the operation of 
each.”5  This is not an assertion of the intellectual or political superiority 
of the Court to the other branches, the states, or the people.  It is the 
simple recognition that courts decide cases.  When an individual claims 
that a law conflicts with her Constitutional right, the Court cannot turn a 
blind eye to the claim.  Unless the Court gets out of the business of 
deciding cases, the act of interpretation is inescapable and given the three 
critical respects in which the Constitution poses the rights question, it is 
inevitable. 
First, there is the problem of how the Bill of Rights interfaces with 
the Fourteenth Amendment.  As enacted, the Bill of Rights was directed 
only at limiting the power of the federal government vis-a-vis the 
individual.  It was not until 1868 that the citizen acquired federal 
constitutional protection against a deprivation of his life, liberty, or 
property without “due process” of law by the states.6  But if by due 
process the Fourteenth Amendment meant all the protections of the first 
eight amendments, it could have, but does not, say that.  And if it does  
 
                                                     
 5. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
 6. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
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not mean that, which, if any, of those original protections or rights 
constitute the process that is due? 
Second, what are we to do with the Ninth Amendment, which warns 
that “[t]he enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be 
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people”7 without a 
footnote indicating what those “others” might be, where they may be 
found, or who has the power to look for them? 
Finally, both the Fifth and the Fourteenth Amendments tell us that 
along with “life” and “property,” “liberty” is protected by due process.  
But the Constitution comes with no glossary defining liberty.  Beyond 
the obvious (freedom from imprisonment), the remainder of whatever 
constitutes the substance of due process rights to liberty is a matter 
someone must authoritatively interpret.  Those who don judges’ robes 
have never been reluctant to do the interpreting as the common law 
tradition is part of a judge’s DNA.  The common law process will, 
therefore, be applied to the rights question but whether it extends the 
thicket or extricates us from it depends on the sources the judge draws 
upon for interpretation.8  The use of legitimate sources will legitimize the 
interpretive process and validate its outcomes. 
The foremost illegitimate source is the personal predilections of the 
individual justices.  A Supreme Court that has assumed for itself the 
ultimate power of judicial review9 exercises that power legitimately only 
by not violating the great principle of governance given to us by the 
Enlightenment: the rule of law.  If there were ever days when 
government was carried out on the whims of “divine right” rulers who 
claimed that the laws they propounded were the revealed word of God 
and thus beyond contestation, those days were gone once appeals to 
reason and the scientific method displaced revelation as the ultimate 
reference point for truth.10  While Hume and others in the Scottish 
Enlightenment had disagreements with John Locke on other matters,11 
                                                     
 7. U.S. CONST. amend. IX. 
 8. See THOMAS B. MCAFFEE ET AL., POWERS RESERVED FOR THE PEOPLE AND THE STATES: A 
HISTORY OF THE NINTH AND TENTH AMENDMENTS 225–43 (Jack Stark ed., 2006) (discussing 
various interpretations of the Ninth Amendment); ROBERT S. PECK, THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND THE 
POLITICS OF INTERPRETATION 29–33 (1992) (discussing the development of the common law). 
 9. See Bruce A. Antkowiak, Essay, Courts, Judicial Review and the Pursuit of Virtue, 45 
DUQ. L. REV. 467, 469–73 (2007) (describing the institutional, procedural, and political background 
of the Court). 
 10. STANLEY J. GRENZ, A PRIMER ON POSTMODERNISM 68–71 (1996). 
 11. Professor Samuel Fleischacker writes that Hume, Hutcheson, and Smith each begin with 
Locke, “if only to disagree with him.”  Samuel Fleischacker, The Impact on America: Scottish 
Philosophy and the American Founding, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO THE SCOTTISH 
ENLIGHTENMENT 321–23 (Alexander Broadie ed., 2003) [hereinafter THE CAMBRIDGE 
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they joined with him on the need for laws to be grounded in human 
processes and expressed openly, with certainty, and with less capacity for 
arbitrary alteration.12  As heirs to this view, we insist that interpretations 
of the words “due process,” “other [rights],” and “liberty” must relate to 
an accepted and credible source of law.  Ah, but what source? 
The debate over sources surfaced in 1798.  In Calder v. Bull, the 
Court contemplated the ex post facto implications of a bill passed by the 
Connecticut legislature.13  Justice Chase felt that in deciding the matter, 
the Court was free to draw upon principles that transcended and predated 
the written words of the Constitution and expressed the “purposes for 
which men enter into society.”14  There are, he said, 
certain vital principles in our free Republican governments, which will 
determine and over-rule an apparent and flagrant abuse of legislative 
power; as to authorize manifest injustice by positive law; or to take 
away that security for personal liberty, or private property, for the 
protection whereof the government was established.  An ACT of the 
Legislature (for I cannot call it a law) contrary to the great first 
principles of the social compact; cannot be considered a rightful 
exercise of legislative authority.15 
                                                                                                                       
COMPANION]. 
 12. In the Second Treatise, Locke observed that the state of nature left those interested in living 
in a civilized society “wanting,” first of all, 
an establish[ed], settled, known Law, received and allowed by common consent to be the 
Standard of Right and Wrong, and the common measure to decide all Controversies 
between them.  For though the Law of Nature be plain and intelligible to all rational 
Creatures; yet Men being biassed by their Interest, as well as ignorant for want of study 
of it, are not apt to allow of it as a Law binding to them in the application of it to their 
particular Cases. 
JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 351 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 
1988) (1689).  Men join society, Locke said, so “that they may have the united strength of the whole 
Society to secure and defend their Properties, and may have standing Rules to bound it, by which 
every one may know what is his.”  Id. at 359.  Hume agreed that it was the intention of “republican 
and free” governments to establish constitutions that would not leave their success solely up to the 
“character and conduct” of the individuals who held the positions of authority in them.  DAVID 
HUME, That Politics May Be Reduced to a Science, in ESSAYS, supra note 3, at 105.  Legislators 
owed it to future constituencies as well as the present one to “provide a system of laws to regulate 
the administration of public affairs” and constitutions are “only so far good, as [they] provid[e] a 
remedy against mal-administration . . . .”  Id. at 105, 108.  Hume thought making the government 
announce laws in a reasonably certain manner was a key device to keep government from 
transgressing authority it otherwise should not enjoy.  John M. Werner, David Hume and America, 
33 J. HIST. OF IDEAS 439, 444 (1972). 
 13. 3 U.S. (4 Dall.) 386, 387 (1798). 
 14. Id. at 388. 
 15. Id. 
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Chase did not tell us how to find those “vital principles,” but he assumed 
that judges learned in the common law would know where to look.16 
Justice Iredell condemned this as reliance on natural law and justice, 
a practice that assumed more power for the Court than the people 
intended it to have.17  Laws that transgress the terms of the Constitution 
should be struck down, Iredell argued, but otherwise judges should not 
don the robes of the philosopher king: 
[Where] the Legislature of the Union, or the Legislature of any member 
of the Union, shall pass a law, within the general scope of their 
constitutional power, the Court cannot pronounce it to be void, merely 
because it is, in their judgment, contrary to the principles of natural 
justice.  The ideas of natural justice are regulated by no fixed standard: 
the ablest and the purest men have differed upon the subject; and all 
that the Court could properly say, in such an event, would be, that the 
Legislature (possessed of an equal right of opinion) had passed an act 
which, in the opinion of the judges, was inconsistent with the abstract 
principles of natural justice.18 
Down through time, Justice Chase’s position won the debate, and various 
justices, while disdaining the idea that their view of a fundamental right 
is correct simply because they are “the ablest and the purest men,” have 
nonetheless drawn upon a variety of sources outside the Constitution to 
discuss the rights question.  Justice Scalia, for example, in his 2008 
analysis of the Second Amendment, argued that this Amendment did not 
create a right so much as it codified a right we inherited from our English 
ancestors.19  And in 2009, Justice Stevens broadly proclaimed that “[t]he 
liberty protected by the Due Process Clause is not a creation of the Bill 
of Rights” because “our Nation has long recognized that the liberty 
safeguarded by the Constitution has far deeper roots.”20  That root, he  
 
                                                     
 16. His view was anticipated by Lord Coke, who ruled in 1610 that “the common law will [] 
controul Acts of Parliament, and sometimes adjudge them to be utterly void: for when an Act of 
Parliament is against common right and reason, or repugnant, or impossible to be performed, the 
common law will controul it, and adjudge such Act to be void . . . .”  Bonham’s Case, (1610) 77 
Eng. Rep. 646, 652 (K.B.).  See also THOMAS B. MCAFFEE, INHERENT RIGHTS, THE WRITTEN 
CONSTITUTION, AND POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY: THE FOUNDER’S UNDERSTANDING 61–62 (2000). 
 17. Calder, 3 U.S. at 399 (Iredell, J., concurring). 
 18. Id. 
 19. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2798 (2008).  As we will see, over a 
hundred years earlier the Court had given little credence to the notion of rights inherited from our 
English forbears.  See the discussion of Hurtado v. California, infra Part III. 
 20. Dist. Att’y’s Office for the Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 2308, 2334 (2009) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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argued, was the “unalienable Rights” language of the Declaration of 
Independence.21 
Those justices have not, however, explained why they used certain 
sources or why there is no accord on what sources to use for 
interpretation of rights language.  The result has been an uneven and 
unpredictable methodology that leaves the Court open to bitter criticism 
and the rights question clouded in doubt.  This is the soil in which 
thickets grow, as a review of the three areas of rights interpretation will 
show. 
III. RIGHTS INTERPRETATION 
A. Selective Incorporation: Reasoning in the Round 
In the 1833 case Barron v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, the 
Court recognized that, as enacted, the Fifth Amendment was “intended 
solely as a limitation on the exercise of power by the government of the 
United States, and is not applicable to the legislation of the states.”22  
When the Fourteenth Amendment declared that “due process” pursuant 
to the federal Constitution now stood in the way of a state depriving 
someone of life, liberty or property,23 did it simply overrule Barron and  
                                                     
 21. Id. 
 22. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 250–51 (1833).  Chief Justice Marshall did find the issue of “great 
importance, but not of much difficulty” and further explained: 
The constitution was ordained and established by the people of the United States for 
themselves, for their own government, and not for the government of the individual 
states.  Each state established a constitution for itself, and, in that constitution, provided 
such limitations and restrictions on the powers of its particular government as its 
judgment dictated.  The people of the United States framed such a government for the 
United States as they supposed best adapted to their situation, and best calculated to 
promote their interests.  The powers they conferred on this government were to be 
exercised by itself; and the limitations on power, if expressed in general terms, are 
naturally, and, we think, necessarily applicable to the government created by the 
instrument.  They are limitations of power granted in the instrument itself, not of distinct 
governments, framed by different persons and for different purposes. 
Id. at 247. 
 23. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 reads: 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.  No State 
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens 
of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws. 
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apply all of the protections in the first eight Amendments to the states?  
The Court said no in 1884 in Hurtado v. California.24 
Hurtado claimed that the Fourteenth Amendment gave him the right 
to have a grand jury consider the criminal charges against him before the 
state could prosecute.25  He claimed this right as heir to Englishmen who 
brought it and all the protections of Magna Carta with them and who 
then explicitly placed it in the Fifth Amendment.26 
The Court held, however, that mere longevity is not enough to make 
a practice a due process right under the Fourteenth Amendment.27  That 
“would be to deny every quality of the law but its age, and to render it 
incapable of progress or improvement.  It would be to stamp upon our 
jurisprudence the unchangeableness attributed to the laws of the Medes 
and Persians.”28  The institutions which once sought to preserve the core 
rights may become outdated abstractions and, thus, 
it is better not to go too far back into antiquity for the best securities for 
our “ancient liberties.”  It is more consonant to the true philosophy of 
our historical legal institutions to say that the spirit of personal liberty 
and individual right, which they embodied, was preserved and 
developed by a progressive growth and wise adaptation to new 
circumstances and situations of the forms and processes found fit to 
give, from time to time, new expression and greater effect to modern 
ideas of self-government.29 
Remember, the Court said, while English law traditions influenced our 
Constitution, the Constitution was really “made for an undefined and 
expanding future, and for a people . . . to be gathered, from many nations 
and of many tongues.”30  Indeed, there 
is nothing . . . which ought to exclude the best ideas of all systems and 
of every age; and as it was the characteristic principle of the common 
law to draw its inspiration from every fountain of justice, we are not to 
assume that the sources of its supply have been exhausted.31 
                                                     
 24. 110 U.S. 516, 535 (1884). 
 25. Id. at 519–20. 
 26. Id. at 521. 
 27. Id. at 531–32. 
 28. Id. at 529. 
 29. Id. at 530. 
 30. Id. at 530–31.  This point was not repeated by Justice Scalia in Heller.  See generally 
District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008). 
 31. Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 531.  The Court’s willingness to embrace principles from other 
countries in construing the content of our own due process became a sticking point for the Court 
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The old provisions “must be held to guaranty, not particular forms of 
procedure, but the very substance of individual rights to life, liberty, and 
property.”32  And what is that “substance”?  It is “those fundamental 
principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and 
political institutions,”33 that is, “certain fundamental rights which [our] 
system of jurisprudence . . . has always recognized.”34  The right to a 
grand jury, although long recognized and embodied in the basic 
document of our political institution, did not fit the bill.35 
By 1908, there was still no clue as to where any of these “fountains 
of justice” might be.  In Twining v. New Jersey, the Court declined “to 
give a comprehensive definition of [due process],” preferring to allow its 
meaning to evolve as more inclusion or exclusion questions arose.36  The 
Court did offer guidance by reference to “general principles, well 
settled . . . which narrow the field of discussion.”37  There are three 
principles that are supposed to give guidance.  First, “due process of law 
may be ascertained by an examination of those settled usages and modes 
of proceedings existing in the common and statute law of England before 
the emigration of our ancestors,” but only usages “shown not to have 
been unsuited to their civil and political condition by having been acted 
on by them after the settlement of this country.”38  Second, even if an old 
English process survived a New England winter we will not keep it for 
that reason alone lest we “straightjacket” American jurisprudence.39  
Third, we will keep “fundamental principles,” those “which . . . protect 
the citizen in his private right, and guard him against the arbitrary action 
of government.”40  “[C]ertain immutable principles of justice which 
inhere in the very idea of free government which no member of the 
Union may disregard . . . [are] fundamental principles of liberty and 
justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions.”41  
You have to admire this “test” if you either do your critical reasoning 
                                                                                                                       
about one hundred years later.  See infra notes 132–34 and accompanying text. 
 32. Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 532. 
 33. Id. at 535. 
 34. Id. at 536 (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Levee Comm’rs, 50 Miss. 468 (1874)). 
 35. Id. at 534–38.  The Court found that preliminary proceedings other than a grand jury were 
equally likely to produce fairness in criminal proceedings.  Id.  The right of grand jury indictment 
was not incorporated against the states, a ruling that stands through today. 
 36. 211 U.S. 78, 100 (1908), overruled in part by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id.  This principle was actually drawn from an older case trying to define “due process” in 
Fifth Amendment terms.  See Den v. Hoboken Land & Imp. Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 276 (1855). 
 39. Twining, 211 U.S. at 101. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 102. 
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with a thesaurus or if you just have fond memories of a merry-go-round.  
Otherwise, they narrow nothing.  The Supreme Court in Twining used 
this “test” to determine that the right against self-incrimination was not 
“fundamental”42 but reversed itself fifty-six years later43 using the same 
test as, all the while, the thicket grew. 
Matters got worse twenty-nine years after Twining in Palko v. 
Connecticut.44  After bluntly rejecting the argument that the demands of 
due process in the federal system swept equally across a state criminal 
prosecution—finding “no such general rule”45—the Court decided not to 
incorporate the double jeopardy protections of the Fifth Amendment 
against the states.46  In doing so, the Court confidently announced that “a 
rationalizing principle which gives to discrete instances a proper order 
and coherence” to questions of this nature had emerged.47  This 
“principle” held that some rights are “not of the very essence of a scheme 
of ordered liberty,” such that to “abolish them is not to violate a 
‘principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our 
people as to be ranked as fundamental.’”48  But since being articulated in 
the Fifth Amendment was not enough to merit being rooted in that 
“tradition or conscience,” what else matters under this “rationalizing 
principle”? 
The key component was simply the thickness of the skin of the 
majority of the justices.  The “rationalizing principle” called for a 
subjective assessment of whether the process used seemed “fair” or if it 
imposed “a hardship so acute and shocking that our polity will not 
endure it”49—that is, if it was generally unprecedented in the civilized 
world.  How the Court would make that assessment was not clear.  
Without that clarification, the “rationalizing principle” was little more 
than a rationalization for the individual justice’s gut instinct. 
                                                     
 42. Id. at 102–14.  It was rejected primarily because older cases had not recognized it.  Id. at 
107–12.  A “meager record of the early colonial time” did not support it as a procedural necessity.  
Id. at 108.  Other countries did not recognize it as fundamental.  Id. at 113.  Overall, it just did not 
seem to be “an immutable principle of justice.”  Id. 
 43. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 5 (1964). 
 44. 302 U.S. 319 (1937), overruled by Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969). 
 45. Id. at 323. 
 46. See id. at 323–28.  In Palko’s first trial the State failed to obtain the death penalty verdict 
they sought.  Id. at 321.  The state then appealed, claiming the judge had erred in several respects.  
Id.  The Connecticut Supreme Court awarded the state a new trial and a second chance to get its 
capital verdict.  Id.  They succeeded, precipitating Palko’s claim.  Id. at 321–22. 
 47. Id. at 325. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 328. 
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Later cases would provide little refinement.  In Adamson v. 
California, the Court once again rejected the idea that those who enacted 
the Fourteenth Amendment “intended its due process clause to draw 
within its scope the earlier amendments to the Constitution.”50  Justice 
Frankfurter noted in concurrence that in the seventy years after the 
passage of the Amendment, the justices were virtually unanimous in the 
belief that the Fourteenth Amendment was not a “shorthand summary of 
the first eight amendments.”51  While acknowledging that some at the 
time of ratification believed it had that “shorthand” effect, Frankfurter 
was persuaded that judges who witnessed the ratification process rejected 
this view.52  Respect for federalism accounted for this, he said, as justices 
were “mindful of the relation of our federal system to a progressively 
democratic society and therefore duly regardful of the scope of authority 
that was left to the States even after the Civil War.”53  The Fourteenth 
Amendment was not to engraft upon the states one exclusive set of 
“procedural arrangements,” but it was simply to insure that whatever 
arrangements the states did choose produced a generally fair system.54  
To construe the Fourteenth Amendment to require all the safeguards of 
the Bill of Rights would be “to confound the familiar with the 
necessary,”55 and “tear up by the roots much of the fabric of law in the 
several States, [depriving them] of opportunity for reforms in legal 
process designed for extending the area of freedom.”56 
Frankfurter reluctantly accepted the “traditions and conscience” 
approach, adding only that the tradition had to be that of “English-
speaking peoples.”57  In the 1960s, the Court focused on traditions in “an 
                                                     
 50. 332 U.S. 46, 54 (1947), overruled in part by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). 
 51. Id. at 62 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
 52. Id. at 63–64.  In his dissent in Duncan v. Louisiana, Justice Harlan exchanged the 
“shorthand” imagery for the “straitjacket”: 
The overwhelming historical evidence marshalled . . . demonstrates, to me conclusively, 
that the Congressmen and state legislators who wrote, debated, and ratified [it] did not 
think they were “incorporating” the Bill of Rights and the very breadth and generality of 
the Amendment’s provisions suggest that its authors did not suppose that the Nation 
would always be limited to mid-19th century conceptions of “liberty” and “due process 
of law” but that the increasing experience and evolving conscience of the American 
people would add new “intermediate premises.” In short, neither history, nor sense, 
supports using the Fourteenth Amendment to put the States in a constitutional straitjacket 
with respect to their own development in the administration of criminal or civil law. 
391 U.S. 145, 174–76 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). 
 53. Adamson, 332 U.S. at 62 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 63. 
 56. Id. at 67. 
 57. Justice Frankfurter’s frustration in being unable to come up with a better approach surfaces 
often in his opinion: 
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Anglo-American regime of ordered liberty,”58 and suggested that 
surveying what states were already doing might supply the core of due 
process.59  This made inertia a candidate to displace gut instinct as the 
“rationalizing principle” of constitutional interpretation. 
Justice Black rejected this whole approach, attacking it historically 
and viscerally.  In Adamson, he accused the Court of bad scholarship, 
insisting that the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to overrule 
Barron and make the Bill of Rights apply to the states.60  Getting the 
                                                                                                                       
There is suggested merely a selective incorporation of the first eight Amendments into 
the Fourteenth Amendment.  Some are in and some are out, but we are left in the dark as 
to which are in and which are out.  Nor are we given the calculus for determining which 
go in and which stay out.  If the basis of selection is merely that those provisions of the 
first eight Amendments are incorporated which commend themselves to individual 
justices as indispensable to the dignity and happiness of a free man, we are thrown back 
to a merely subjective test. . . . In the history of thought “natural law” has a much longer 
and much better founded meaning and justification than such subjective selection of the 
first eight Amendments for incorporation into the Fourteenth. . . . We are called upon to 
apply to the difficult issues of our own day the wisdom afforded by the great opinions in 
this field. . . . This guidance bids us to be duly mindful of the heritage of the past, with its 
great lessons of how liberties are won and how they are lost.  As judges charged with the 
delicate task of subjecting the government of a continent to the Rule of Law we must be 
particularly mindful that it is “a constitution we are expounding,” so that it should not be 
imprisoned in what are merely legal forms even though they have the sanction of the 
Eighteenth Century. 
. . . . 
. . . The relevant question is whether the criminal proceedings which resulted in 
conviction deprived the accused of the due process of law to which the United States 
Constitution entitled him.  Judicial review of that guaranty of the Fourteenth Amendment 
inescapably imposes upon this Court an exercise of judgment upon the whole course of 
the proceedings in order to ascertain whether they offend those canons of decency and 
fairness which express the notions of justice of English-speaking peoples even 
toward those charged with the most heinous offenses.  These standards of justice are not 
authoritatively formulated anywhere as though they were prescriptions in a 
pharmacopoeia.  But neither does the application of the Due Process Clause imply that 
judges are wholly at large.  The judicial judgment in applying the Due Process Clause 
must move within the limits of accepted notions of justice and is not to be based upon the 
idiosyncrasies of a merely personal judgment.  The fact that judges among themselves 
may differ whether in a particular case a trial offends accepted notions of justice is not 
disproof that general rather than idiosyncratic standards are applied.  An important 
safeguard against such merely individual judgment is an alert deference to the judgment 
of the State court under review. 
Id. at 65–68 (emphasis added). 
 58. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 150 n.14 (1968).  See generally Griffin v. California, 
380 U.S. 609 (1965) (holding that the prosecutor’s comments on defendant’s failure to testify 
violated the Fourteenth Amendment); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (discussing whether the 
concept of ordered liberty protects individuals from compulsory self-incrimination). 
 59. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 150 n.14. 
 60. Adamson, 332 U.S. at 71–72 (Black, J., dissenting).  Black chastised the Court for relying 
on historical studies of the Amendment that did not give adequate credit to the views of 
Congressman John Bingham of Ohio, a man Black called the “Madison” of the first section of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 74, 94–98.  Black included an appendix to his opinion in Adamson 
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history wrong was dangerous, Black said, since it left the Court free to 
fill in the content of due process by reference to the same pernicious 
source that had alarmed Justice Iredell a century earlier: natural law.61  
Using natural law to interpret the Constitution “degrade[s] the 
constitutional safeguards of the Bill of Rights and simultaneously 
appropriate[s] for this Court a broad power which we are not authorized 
by the Constitution to exercise.”62  Natural law theory is “an incongruous 
excrescence on our Constitution. . . .  [A] formula [that is] itself a 
violation of our Constitution, in that it subtly conveys to courts, at the 
expense of legislatures, ultimate power over public policies in fields 
where no specific provision of the Constitution limits legislative 
power.”63 
If natural law existed, Black was convinced that his colleagues had 
no magical way to access it.  Attempts to divine “due process” from a 
source other than the language of the Constitution made the Court an 
arbitrary authority “substituting its own concepts of decency and 
fundamental justice for the language of the Bill of Rights.”64  This was 
also unnecessary, he claimed, as the Bill of Rights was no eighteenth-
century straitjacket unsuited to the wardrobe of modern times.65  While 
its provisions “were designed to meet ancient evils . . . they are the same 
kind of human evils that have emerged from century to century wherever 
excessive power is sought by the few at the expense of the many.”66 
The arbitrariness and circularity of the reasoning used to guide 
incorporation analysis also occurred to Justice Harlan.  In Duncan v. 
Louisiana, Harlan dissented from the “incorporation” of the Sixth 
Amendment’s jury trial protections against the states, but mostly he 
disdained the process that achieved it: 
                                                                                                                       
that quotes from Bingham 
conclusively demonstrat[ing] that the language of the first section of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, taken as a whole, was thought by those responsible for its submission to the 
people, and by those who opposed its submission, sufficiently explicit to guarantee that 
thereafter no state could deprive its citizens of the privileges and protections of the Bill of 
Rights. 
Id. at 74–75.  Bingham, who was originally from Pennsylvania, was a prominent figure in many of 
the enormous events occurring in and around the conclusion of the Civil War.  See generally ERVING 
E. BEAUREGARD, BINGHAM OF THE HILLS: POLITICIAN AND DIPLOMAT EXTRAORDINARY (1989); 
Richard L. Aynes, The Antislavery and Abolitionist Background of John A. Bingham, 37 CATH. U. L. 
REV. 881 (1988). 
 61. Adamson, 332 U.S. at 69–70 (Black, J., dissenting). 
 62. Id. at 70. 
 63. Id. at 75. 
 64. Id. at 89. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
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Even if I could agree that the question before us is whether Sixth 
Amendment jury trial is totally “in” or totally “out,” I can find in the 
Court’s opinion no real reasons for concluding that it should be “in.”  
The basis for differentiating among clauses in the Bill of Rights cannot 
be that only some clauses are in the Bill of Rights, or that only some 
are old and much praised, or that only some have played an important 
role in the development of federal law.  These things are true of all.  
The Court says that some clauses are more “fundamental” than others, 
but it turns out to be using this word in a sense that . . . is of no help.  
The word does not mean “analytically critical to procedural fairness” 
for no real analysis of the role of the jury in making procedures fair is 
even attempted. Instead, the word turns out to mean “old,” “much 
praised,” and “found in the Bill of Rights.”  The definition of 
“fundamental” thus turns out to be circular.67 
Despite his appreciation of this circularity, Harlan’s solution was 
even less principled.  The “rights,” or due process, question, he said, “is 
whether [a citizen] was denied any element of fundamental procedural 
fairness.”68  By what standard, he did not say. 
If this ride on the judicial merry-go-round produced consistent 
results, perhaps we could forget searching for a true rationalizing 
principle.  But if consistency is the measure of success, selective 
incorporation has been a disaster.  Numerous decisions on incorporation 
were reversed within a few decades using the same basic template for 
analysis.69  The consequences of the imprecision of this analysis were 
sometimes quite severe.  Thirty-two years after turning down Frank 
Palko’s appeal, the Supreme Court reversed itself and ruled that there is a 
fundamental right of double jeopardy against the state, again using the 
same test.70  This change of heart came too late for Palko who was 
executed in Connecticut’s electric chair within days of losing his 
appeal.71 
To be sure, the Framers made due process something of a mystery.  
They put it in the Fifth Amendment, but surrounded it there with other 
specific procedural protections, implying that due process means 
something more.72  Unraveling the mystery of what more merely by 
intoning the phrase “traditions and conscience of our people,” however, 
                                                     
 67. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 183 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 68. Id. 
 69. Justice Brennan chronicles many of these reversals in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 4–7 
(1964). 
 70. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 787, 796 (1969). 
 71. OYEZ.org, Palko v. Connecticut, http://www.oyez.org/cases/1901-1939/1937/1937_135 
(last visited Nov. 23, 2009). 
 72. See Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 534–35 (1884). 
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makes rights seem the product of slight of hand and leaves the Court 
open to charges of using a smokescreen for the kind of arbitrary 
usurpation of authority judges love to publicly disdain.  A sincere effort 
to base due process on an accurate perception of the conscience of the 
people seems like a good approach for a Court in a republic to take.  But 
without articulating principles to accomplish that, all we get is a nasty 
thicket of dangerous uncertainty. 
B. The Ninth Amendment: Blinded by a Penumbra 
The relatively simple language of the Ninth Amendment73 belies the 
complex issues of interpretation it has created.  The Court could have 
simply interpreted it to mean that merely by listing rights in the first 
eight amendments, the Framers did not imply that the list was 
exhaustive.74  That is, the Court could have found the Ninth to be only 
declaratory, a tautology stating the obvious point that the people would 
not be so foolish to limit their liberties by articulating a closed-end group 
of them.75 
                                                     
 73. “The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or 
disparage others retained by the people.”  U.S. CONST. amend. IX. 
 74. Alexander Hamilton argued against a Bill of Rights for fear that it would be seen as a 
closed-end list.  Bruce A. Antkowiak, Saving Probable Cause, 40 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 569, 579–80 
(2007).  Madison clearly wanted “an express declaration made that[] all rights not expressly given 
up[] are retained.”  GAZZETTE U.S., June 10, 1789, reprinted in CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE 
DOCUMENTARY RECORD FROM THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS 67 (Helen E. Veit et al. eds., 1991).  
A resolution he proposed on June 8, 1789, called for a “prefix” to the Constitution that “all power is 
originally invested in, and consequently derived from the people.”  Madison Resolution (1789), 
reprinted in CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra, at 11.  And in one of his first drafts of the 
Amendment, he was more clearly building that hedge when he proposed that it read, in part, “[t]he 
exceptions here or elsewhere in the constitution, made in favor of particular rights, shall not be 
construed as to diminish the just importance of other rights retained by the people; or as to enlarge 
the powers delegated by the constitution; but either as actual limitations of such powers, or as 
inserted merely for greater caution.”  Id. at 13. 
 75. Professor Amar writes that the Ninth Amendment, like the others, was first and foremost a 
declaratory document, stating the nature of human rights, not purporting to create them: 
As modern day legal positivists, we tend to view the Bill as creating or conferring legal 
rights.  But the congressional resolution accompanying the Bill explicitly described some 
of its provisions as “declaratory.”  To a nineteenth-century believer in natural rights, the 
Bill was not simply an enactment of We the People as the Sovereign Legislature bringing 
new legal rights into existence, but a declaratory judgment by We the People as the 
Sovereign High Court that certain natural or fundamental rights already existed.  Under 
this view, the First Amendment was not merely an interpretation of the positive law code 
of the original Constitution, declaring that Congress lacked Article I, Section 8 
enumerated power to regulate religion or suppress speech; the Amendment was also a 
declaration that certain fundamental “rights” and “freedoms”—of assembly, petition, 
speech, press, and religious exercise—preexisted the Constitution.  Why else, it might be 
asked, did the Amendment speak of “the” freedom of speech, implying a preexisting 
entitlement?  The Ninth and Tenth Amendments did more than make explicit rules of 
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After 174 years, the Supreme Court rejected this option as one that 
did not give “real effect” to the language of the Amendment.76  Instead, 
the Ninth Amendment was read as a grant of power to the Court to find 
the “other” rights without waiting for the democratic process to supply 
them by Amendments. 
The search for “other” rights was launched in 1965 in Griswold v. 
Connecticut when the Court reversed the convictions of a doctor and his 
married-couple patients for violating a statute that criminalized 
prescribing or using artificial birth control.77  Justice Douglas’s majority 
opinion made passing reference to the Ninth Amendment,78 but it was in 
Justice Goldberg’s concurrence that the new jurisprudence of the Ninth 
was born. 
Goldberg’s historical analysis of the Ninth Amendment led him to 
conclude that “[i]t was proffered to quiet expressed fears that a bill of 
specifically enumerated rights could not be sufficiently broad to cover all 
essential rights and that the specific mention of certain rights would be 
interpreted as a denial that others were protected.”79  But those fears 
would rise again, he warned, if the Amendment was given “no effect 
whatsoever” by holding that “a right so basic and fundamental and so 
deep-rooted in our society as the right of privacy in marriage may be 
infringed because that right is not guaranteed in so many words by the 
first eight amendments.”80 
And speaking of fears, Goldberg assured everyone that this was not 
the beginning of a radical expansion of Supreme Court authority in a 
non-principled direction because, after all, clear limits and direction 
already existed in the process of selective incorporation.81  The “other” 
rights were already among those to be applied against the states under the 
Fourteenth,82 meaning that the Ninth simply “serves to support what this 
Court has been doing in protecting fundamental rights.”83 
                                                                                                                       
construction for interpreting the Constitution as a positive law code; they also declared 
that certain “rights” and “powers” were retained by “the people” and “reserved” to them 
in contradistinction to “states.” 
Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 YALE L.J. 1193, 1206–07 
(1992) (footnotes omitted). 
 76. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 490–91 (1965). 
 77. Id. at 482. 
 78. Id. at 482–86. 
 79. Id. at 488–89 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (footnote omitted). 
 80. Id. at 491.  Indeed, he proclaimed that this sort of interpretation would violate the Ninth 
Amendment.  Id. 
 81. Id. at 491–92. 
 82. Id. at 486–87, 491–92. 
 83. Id. at 493. 
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The method for finding the other rights was two-fold.84  First, the 
Court could employ the same circular reasoning used in the selective 
incorporation cases.85  By studying “traditions” and the “conscience” of 
the people, a right “rooted” there would be seen as “fundamental” 
because without it, we would deny a principle of our institutions that 
was, well, “fundamental.”86 
But other rights could also be found by a new “penumbral” analysis 
that was espoused by the Griswold majority.87  Justice Douglas found an 
other right of marital privacy stemming from the penumbra of the rights 
already listed in the Bill of Rights.88  This process was superficially 
benign as it was one of mere inference.89  It was legitimate (principled) 
because it was closely tied to the text of the Constitution.  It was 
necessary, we were told, because otherwise “the specific rights would be 
less secure.”90 
But it put no check on the process of inference.  A right to read may 
be inferred from the right of free speech, but in finding a right of marital 
privacy in the penumbras of various Amendments that allegedly created 
“zones of privacy”91 and harbored “a right of privacy older than the Bill 
                                                     
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id.  The circular “test” in Griswold is rendered thusly: 
In determining which rights are fundamental, judges are not left at large to decide 
cases in light of their personal and private notions.  Rather, they must look to the 
“traditions and [collective] conscience of our people” to determine whether a principle is 
“so rooted [there] . . . as to be ranked as fundamental.”  The inquiry is whether a right 
involved “is of such a character that it cannot be denied without violating those 
‘fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and 
political institutions.’” 
Id. at 493 (citation omitted).  The “how” of this process is never discussed, but it was used later to 
find an “other” Ninth Amendment right of parents regarding the care and custody of their children.  
See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65–66 (2000); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972). 
 87. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484–86. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Various First Amendment rights were used as an example: 
The association of people is not mentioned in the Constitution nor in the Bill of 
Rights.  The right to educate a child in a school of the parents’ choice—whether public or 
private or parochial—is also not mentioned.  Nor is the right to study any particular 
subject or any foreign language.  Yet the First Amendment has been construed to include 
certain of those rights. 
. . . [T]he State may not, consistently with the spirit of the First Amendment, contract 
the spectrum of available knowledge.  The right of freedom of speech and press includes 
not only the right to utter or to print, but the right to distribute, the right to receive, the 
right to read and freedom of inquiry, freedom of thought, and freedom to teach—indeed 
the freedom of the entire university community. 
Id. at 482 (citations omitted). 
 90. Id. at 483. 
 91. The Court mentioned the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments, each of which 
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of Rights—older than our political parties, older than our school 
system,”92 the Court had once again unmoored its analysis from the text 
of the Constitution and set it adrift into an uncharted venue.  This was no 
longer simple inference like branches flowing from the main trunk of a 
tree.  The penumbral process invited the kind of unrestrained and 
unpredictable growth typical of most nasty thickets. 
And the growth was robust.  Although it was not clear how it helped 
preserve her right against unreasonable searches or to avoid having 
soldiers quartered in her home, the right of a woman to choose to 
terminate a pregnancy of a non-viable fetus was found in the shadowy 
contours of penumbras.93  Penumbras soon went in a myriad of 
directions,94 ostensibly to resolve the concerns of the Framers (Madison 
in particular) over a restrictive reading of the Bill of Rights.95 
But whether Madison would agree that the new jurisprudence of the 
Ninth Amendment was sufficiently principled to avoid the criticism that 
“a judge’s responsibility to determine whether a right is basic and 
fundamental in this sense vests him with unrestricted personal 
discretion,”96 Justice Black certainly did not.97  He ridiculed the Court’s 
attempt to give substance to the test under the Ninth Amendment, 
arguing that all such “formulas based on ‘natural justice,’ or others which 
mean the same thing . . . require judges to determine what is or is not 
constitutional on the basis of their own appraisal of what laws are unwise 
or unnecessary.  The power to make such decisions is of course that of a 
                                                                                                                       
has “penumbras, formed by emanations from [the Bill of Rights] guarantees.”  Id. at 483–84. 
 92. Id. at 486.  Justice Goldberg heartily agreed that such a right could be found in the 
emanation from our entire constitutional system.  Id. at 493–94 (Goldberg, J., concurring). 
 93. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 129, 152–53 (1973).  But see Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. 
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 839 (1992) (stating that the “all-encompassing ‘right to privacy,’” as claimed 
in Roe, was too far of a reach from Griswold). 
 94. In Richmond Newspapers, Inc., v. Virginia, the Court held “that the right to attend criminal 
trials is implicit in the guarantees of the First Amendment; without the freedom to attend such trials, 
which people have exercised for centuries, important aspects of freedom of speech and ‘of the press 
could be eviscerated.’”  448 U.S. 555, 580 (1980) (quoting Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 
(1972)) (footnote omitted).  Justice Douglas also invoked the Ninth Amendment in bemoaning the 
loss of privacy in the government’s use of sophisticated surveillance techniques in criminal 
investigations.  Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323, 341 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting).  
Douglas further argued that when a city closed its swimming pools rather than integrate them, their 
acts violated a right to be free from racial discrimination, a right tracing its origin to the Ninth and 
other Amendments.  Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 233–34, 237 (1971) (Douglas, J., 
dissenting).  He also believed that the penumbra of the free speech right of the First Amendment 
could protect a public-school student from discipline over the length of his hair.  Freeman v. Flake, 
405 U.S. 1032, 1032 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting in denial of certiorari). 
 95. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 579–80. 
 96. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 494 n.7 (Goldberg, J., concurring). 
 97. Id. at 510 (Black, J., dissenting). 
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legislative body.”98  All that the members of the Court can rely upon in 
this area is “their personal and private notions,” he said, as the Court 
“certainly has no machinery with which to take a Gallup Poll.  And the 
scientific miracles of this age have not yet produced a gadget which the 
Court can use to determine what traditions are rooted in the ‘[collective] 
conscience of our people.’”99 
The very notion that the Ninth was a grant of power to the Court was 
“a shocking doctrine,” Justice Black said, since the Ninth was meant to 
specifically limit the power of government, not to enrich it by placing the 
power to identify fundamental constitutional rights into the hands of its 
judicial branch on the federal level.100  Since the Framers never intended 
to give such power to the Court, the Court simply usurped it from the 
people it claims it was protecting.101  This process threatened the 
structural protections of separation of powers and federalism,102 as the 
Court was not the agency of change for the Constitution; the process of 
amendment was.103  Justice Black warned that the Court, through “broad, 
unbounded judicial authority,” had rendered itself “a day-to-day 
constitutional convention.”104 
                                                     
 98. Id. at 511–12 (footnote omitted).  Indeed, he collects in a footnote all of the “catchwords 
and catch phrases” used to supply substance to the limit the Court believes is imposed upon a judge 
discerning what rights are protected as fundamental under either the Ninth Amendment or due 
process.  An edited version of this summary is as follows: 
Thus it has been said that this Court can forbid state action which “shocks the 
conscience,” sufficiently to “shock itself into the protective arms of the Constitution.”  It 
has been urged that States may not run counter to the “decencies of civilized conduct,” or 
“some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be 
ranked as fundamental,” or to “those canons of decency and fairness which express the 
notions of justice of English-speaking peoples,” or to “the community’s sense of fair play 
and decency.”  It has been said that we must decide whether a state law is “fair, 
reasonable and appropriate,” or is rather “an unreasonable, unnecessary and arbitrary 
interference with the right of the individual to his personal liberty or to enter into . . . 
contracts.”  States, under this philosophy, cannot act in conflict with “deeply rooted 
feelings of the community,” or with “fundamental notions of fairness and justice.”  
Perhaps the clearest, frankest and briefest explanation of how this due process approach 
works is the statement in another case handed down today that this Court is to invoke the 
Due Process Clause to strike down state procedures or laws which it can “not tolerate.” 
Id. at 513 n.4 (citations omitted). 
 99. Id. at 519 (footnote omitted). 
 100. Id. at 519–20. 
 101. Id. at 520. 
 102. Id. at 520–21. 
 103. Id. at 526–27.  Justice Black agreed with Judge Learned Hand in the observation that, “[f]or 
myself it would be most irksome to be ruled by a bevy of Platonic Guardians, even if I knew how to 
choose them, which I assuredly do not.”  Id. 
 104. Id. at 520. 
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Justice Stewart agreed with Justice Black105and, years later, Justice 
Scalia did as well.  While Justice Scalia believed that one of the other 
rights in the Ninth Amendment was the right of parents to direct their 
child’s upbringing, he stated that he did “not believe that the power 
which the Constitution confers upon me as a judge entitles me to deny 
legal effect to laws that (in my view) infringe upon what is (in my view) 
that unenumerated right.”106  Here, as in selective incorporation,  the 
“traditions” and “penumbra” tests are indeed so lacking in any stated, 
principled methodology that denying that personal discretion is at their 
root seems entirely hypocritical.  But while Justice Black’s view may be 
the antidote to that hypocrisy, there is reason to hesitate before we 
embrace it. 
The Ninth says that there are rights other than those listed in the 
eight amendments that precede it, not just that those specific rights 
should be read broadly.  So what should the Court do when it confronts a 
situation in which the text of the Bill of Rights could not logically be 
stretched to protect a citizen, but what is at stake seems at least as 
important as not having soldiers quartered in your home?  Justice Black 
would rule that there is no right a Court could enforce and tell the citizen 
to write to their legislator and get the amendment process churning. 
But that would require holding either that, (1) there are no rights 
other than what is contained in the language of the first eight 
amendments (something the Ninth Amendment specifically says is not 
true) or, (2) that the Framers believed that there are rights as real and 
vital as the ones written down but which are not enforceable because, 
and only because, they are not inscribed on parchment.  This latter 
reading makes the Ninth Amendment not just a declaratory text but one 
that actively prohibits a Court from protecting one of the other rights that 
the Ninth Amendment says really exists.  And while allowing 
enforcement of such an other right would increase the power of the 
Court, making it unenforceable would vastly increase the power of 
legislatures whose laws are most often the alleged infringer of the right 
the citizen asserts. 
So perhaps it is too late for the Court to get out of the other rights 
business altogether.  But how it is doing so now will neither clear the 
                                                     
 105. Id. at 529 (Stewart, J., dissenting).  Stewart accused the majority of turning “somersaults 
with history” in how it read the Ninth Amendment.  The Amendment was declaratory only, Stewart 
said, a truism “to make clear that the adoption of the Bill of Rights did not alter the plan that the 
Federal Government was to be a government of express and limited powers, and that all rights and 
powers not delegated to it were retained by the people and the individual States.”  Id. at 529–30. 
 106. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 92 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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thicket nor stunt its growth. Once again, finding a more principled and 
transparent methodology just might help. 
C. Substantive Due Process: The “Traditions” Approach to “Liberty” 
and the Jurisprudence of Easy Answers 
The Court has given us a warning about its effort to define the 
concept of “liberty” set forth in the due process clauses of the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments: 
Substantive due process has at times been a treacherous field for this 
Court.  There are risks when the judicial branch gives enhanced 
protection to certain substantive liberties without the guidance of the 
more specific provisions of the Bill of Rights. . . . [T]here is reason for 
concern lest the only limits to such judicial intervention become the 
predilections of those who happen at the time to be Members of this 
Court.  That history counsels caution and restraint.  But it does not 
counsel abandonment . . . .107 
The Court has not abandoned the effort, but the field remains quite 
treacherous. 
“Caution and restraint” have evidently dictated that the Court find its 
poetic side in this part of the rights question.  The “freedom to marry . . . 
[is] essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.”108  
Furthermore, the Court has extolled marriage and procreation as 
“fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race.”109  Abortion 
rights are among those “personal decisions relating to marriage, 
procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and 
education . . . involving the most intimate and personal choices a person 
may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy 
[that] are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”110  And, of course, there is what Justice Scalia now 
derisively calls the “sweet-mystery-of-life”111 passage: “At the heart of 
liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, 
of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.  Beliefs about these 
matters could not define the attributes of personhood were they formed 
                                                     
 107. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502 (1977) (footnote omitted). 
 108. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967). 
 109. Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). 
 110. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992). 
 111. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 588 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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under compulsion of the State.”112  This is not the normal language of the 
law.  It all may be entirely true, but we are not told why it is true.  It may 
as well be written in iambic pentameter or haiku. 
The substance of “liberty” turns out to be the product of the 
“traditions” analysis we have seen before.  Liberty becomes an arbitrary 
subset of things done in the past, defined cryptically as things that “[t]he 
American people have always regarded . . . as matters of supreme 
importance.”113  Using this sort of sound-bite jurisprudence, the Court 
found that a mother, her son and her two grandsons had a right protecting 
them from eviction by a housing authority, reasoning that family life is 
basic, historical, cherished and, well, traditional: 
 Appropriate limits on substantive due process come not from 
drawing arbitrary lines but rather from careful “respect for the 
teachings of history (and), solid recognition of the basic values that 
underlie our society”.  Our decisions establish that the Constitution 
protects the sanctity of the family precisely because the institution of 
the family is deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.  It is 
through the family that we inculcate and pass down many of our most 
cherished values, moral and cultural.114 
The problem is, though, that our past is littered with practices, some of 
which we may be proud to call traditions and others we would just as 
soon forget.  Racism, sexism, intolerance to non-Christian beliefs, and 
imperialistic, expansionist ideals all may be said to be rooted in our 
Nation’s history.115  So how do we know what page of the family album 
of American history contains the portraits of honored traditions? 
Justice Brennan believed that there was no principled way to do this.  
He saw the Court engaging in a failed search for limits in this area and 
feared that it would be criticized for defining liberty solely in terms of 
the whims of the individual justices: 
[The Court] finds this limitation in “tradition.”  Apparently oblivious to 
the fact that this concept can be as malleable and as elusive as “liberty” 
itself, the plurality pretends that tradition places a discernible border 
around the Constitution.  The pretense is seductive; it would be 
comforting to believe that a search for “tradition” involves nothing 
more idiosyncratic or complicated than poring through dusty volumes 
                                                     
 112. Casey, 505 U.S. at 851. 
 113. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923). 
 114. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503–04 (1977) (citations omitted). 
 115. Such practices were often defended, in their time, by the invocation of “natural law.” See, 
e.g., DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 293 
(1996) (The “abolition of slavery would violate the natural law of property.”). 
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on American history.  Yet . . . “[w]hat the deeply rooted traditions of 
the country are is arguable.” . . . Because reasonable people can 
disagree about the content of particular traditions, and because they can 
disagree even about which traditions are relevant to the definition of 
“liberty,” the plurality has not found the objective boundary that it 
seeks.116 
Indeed, the traditions approach hardly gives the kind of limit to the 
Court’s discretion the Court seems to think it does.  Picking the timing, 
scope, and content of a given practice to see if it qualifies as a tradition is 
a discretionary act of the first order.117 
On the right length of time for a practice to be a tradition, the Court 
is as subjective as Red Riding Hood selecting porridge; it has “to identify 
the point at which a tradition becomes firm enough to be relevant to our 
definition of liberty and the moment at which it becomes too obsolete to 
be relevant any longer”118 with no objective basis for this calculation.  
Moreover, the longevity of a tradition is not necessarily related to its 
present value.  People can do dumb things for years while wisdom lately 
acquired is wisdom nonetheless. 
Picking the “scope” of the “honored tradition” is also wholly 
arbitrary.  While the Court has continually found the “liberty interest . . . 
of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children” to be 
“perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by 
this Court,”119 in Michael H. v. Gerald D., that interest was 
superseded.120  A child’s biological father was found to have an 
insufficient liberty interest to obtain a visitation order where a state 
statute presumed that the child’s father was the man to whom the mother 
was married when the biological father impregnated her.121  The relevant 
tradition in the case, Justice Scalia wrote, was not the liberty of a father 
in the care, custody, and control of his child, but the tradition of the law 
condemning adulterers.122  The formula to find the relevant tradition was 
this: 
We refer to the most specific level at which a relevant tradition 
protecting, or denying protection to, the asserted right can be identified.  
                                                     
 116. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 137 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 117. Id. at 138–41 (discussing the plurality’s approach to determining tradition). 
 118. Id. at 138. 
 119. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000).  The Court used that interest to overturn a state 
law that gave grandparents visitation rights over the objection of the child’s mother.  Id. at 65–72. 
 120. 491 U.S. at 125–27. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at 129–30. 
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If, for example, there were no societal tradition, either way, regarding 
the rights of the natural father of a child adulterously conceived, we 
would have to consult, and (if possible) reason from, the traditions 
regarding natural fathers in general.  But there is such a more specific 
tradition, and it unqualifiedly denies protection to such a parent.123 
Note that finding the “most specific level” for a relevant tradition is not 
scientific.  The judge is not issued a judicial microscope turned up to the 
highest magnification to find what she seeks.  As in all cases of traditions 
analysis, the judge selects what traditions are relevant to the case by 
making a discretionary judgment unguided by principles that would 
respect the basic institution of the rule of law.  Selecting the scope of the 
tradition is thus quite subjective and arbitrary.124 
In Lawrence v. Texas,125 the subjective nature of the timing and 
content of the “relevant” tradition was shown.  Lawrence overruled the 
1986 decision in Bowers v. Hardwick126 that upheld laws criminalizing 
private, consensual, adult homosexual conduct on the basis that sodomy 
had never been recognized as a fundamental right.127  Seventeen years 
later, the Lawrence Court considered matters of private, intimate conduct 
protected by the liberty provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment.128  To 
accomplish this reversal, the Lawrence Court demonstrated what a 
wonderfully compliant formula the traditions analysis really is.  While 
Justice Kennedy, writing for the Lawrence plurality, claimed that Bowers 
had misread history and attributed an “anti-gay” origin to a variety of 
statutes that were directed at other considerations,129 he had to admit that 
Chief Justice Burger’s concurrence in Bowers accurately collected a 
number of laws passed throughout the Nation’s history that plainly did 
announce and enforce a tradition of anti-gay bias.130  But despite what  
 
                                                     
 123. Id. at 127–28 n.6. 
 124. Justice Scalia’s own opinion in District of Columbia v. Heller illustrates this.  In deciding 
that the Second Amendment comprehends an individual right to carry firearms, he sought out the 
understanding of the terms not only from the eighteenth century but also from the English Bill of 
Rights of the seventeenth century. 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2791–94, 2798–99 (2008).  However, when 
confronted with the argument that such an analysis should yield the conclusion that any individual 
right recognized in those eras should apply only to weaponry of that same period (a very specific 
level of tradition) he dismissed such talk by the curt rejection “[w]e do not interpret constitutional 
rights that way.”  Id. at 2791. 
 125. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 126. 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 127. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567–68, 577–78 (plurality opinion). 
 128. See id. at 578–79. 
 129. Id. at 568–71. 
 130. Id. at 571–72. 
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had existed for decades or more before Bowers, Justice Kennedy 
reasoned the “traditions” analysis must come with an expiration date: 
In all events we think that our laws and traditions in the past half 
century are of most relevance here.  These references show an 
emerging awareness that liberty gives substantial protection to adult 
persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives in matters 
pertaining to sex.131 
And it was not just “our” traditions and laws that are relevant, Justice 
Kennedy said, but what other segments of the Western world have done 
during this period as well.132  Earning the wrath of Justice Scalia for 
doing so,133 Justice Kennedy cited reforms of anti-gay laws by the British 
Parliament and the European Court of Human Rights as evidence of the 
content of the truly relevant tradition.134 
Why was the last fifty years made the relevant time period here?  
Why look to the United Kingdom, and the European Union and not the 
Pacific Rim, Africa, or anywhere else outside the jurisdiction of our 
Constitution?  The answer is not clear.  It is, we may suppose, as 
arbitrary a selection as anything else in this area.  Analysis by traditions 
is, at the end of the day, a friend to all and an enemy of principled 
analysis.  By picking the time period you want, the scope of what you 
wish to include in it and the breadth of the relevant pool of practices you 
wish to draw upon, a traditions analysis can work for all sides of any 
issue.  Its ubiquitous nature is, however, reason enough not to use it if we 
wish to have the Court act like an institution within a constitutional 
framework and desire that the rights question be answered within a 
politically transparent context. 
The traditions approach is, as we have seen, at the heart of all three 
areas of “rights” interpretation and in all three areas its gossamer quality 
has failed to shield the Court from criticism that they are just making 
                                                     
 131. Id. (emphasis added).  In the post-Bowers era, Kennedy noted, a number of state courts 
rejected Bowers and found protection for such conduct within their own state constitutions.  Id. at 
573. 
 132. See id. at 572–73. 
 133. Id. at 598 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  Scalia wrote: 
The Court’s discussion of these foreign views (ignoring, of course, the many countries 
that have retained criminal prohibitions on sodomy) is therefore meaningless dicta.  
Dangerous dicta, however, since “this Court . . . should not impose foreign moods, fads, 
or fashions on Americans.” 
Id. (quoting Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari)).  
Over 100 years earlier, of course, the Court had embraced this multi-national approach.  See 
generally Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884). 
 134. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572–73 (plurality opinion). 
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things up as they go along.  The whole tradition approach is flawed from 
the outset and no amount of specifying it, confining it to a relevant 
number of decades, or expanding it to include the past or current 
practices of some segment of the community of nations will fix it.  It 
does not work because it is lazy.  It finds a familiar practice and stops, 
instead of trying to understand why we practiced it in the first place. 
Understanding why we should keep traditions is the key.  Families 
have traditions just as nations do.  If each year at Christmas the entire 
family travels to Uncle Henry’s for dinner, a wonderful tradition may 
well be established.  But when Uncle Henry dies, or if he and the rest of 
the family have a bitter falling out over a matter of inheritance, showing 
up at his doorstep on Christmas day hardly seems like a practice worth 
maintaining.  The essence of that tradition, however, can most certainly 
be preserved.  If the children who ate dinner at Uncle Henry’s now create 
the same warm sense of family at holiday dinners of their own, then the 
thing that mattered in the past is preserved regardless of where we are 
when we have our turkey on December 25th, or that, instead of turkey, 
we now eat a salmon soufflé. 
When the Court seeks to rely upon traditions it has to remember that 
it is not the curator of the Museum of Americana where historical 
preservation for historical preservation’s sake is the goal.  The past is 
filled with truth, liberty, and great insight into human nature, along with 
ignorance, biases, and bigotries that grew up with them.  The great task is 
to discern the core of traditions and bring forward those aspects of the 
past which will secure for us today the measure of respect from 
government we believe a free and honorable people must have.  Martin 
Heidegger advised us to be “ruthless” in seeking the tradition that lies 
within the past.135  The use our current jurisprudence makes of tradition 
does not honor the wisdom of the past so much as it simply enshrines the 
boxes it was packaged in.  Not making a concerted effort to find the truth 
inside those boxes will, sooner or later, lead us to believe they were 
empty in the first place.  In answering the rights question, that is a 
cynicism we cannot afford.  Our failure to assert a meaningful 
conception of rights will mean that a void will be created—and voids in  
 
                                                     
 135. Heidegger stated: 
Ruthlessness toward the tradition is reverence before the past—and it is authentic only in 
the appropriation of this—the past—out of the destruction of that—the tradition.  From 
here out must each actual historical work, which is something fully other than history in 
the usual sense, insinuate itself in the discipline of philosophy. 
ROGER BERKOWITZ, THE GIFT OF SCIENCE: LEIBNIZ AND THE MODERN LEGAL TRADITION xx (2005) 
(quoting MARTIN HEIDEGGER, PLATO’S SOPHIST 178 (1954)). 
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any political universe do not stay empty as long as a government stands 
ready to fill them. 
We have surrounded rights in a thicket of pretentious verbiage.  We 
seem unwilling or unable to substitute for that verbiage an analytical 
process that we can accept as legitimate.  Such a process, human in 
origin, will never be infallible, but at least it could allow justices to argue 
within it without having to use as their ultimate source of authority the 
plea, “trust me.”  Step one in finding that process requires recognizing 
that we did not originally plan to ask the modern rights question at all. 
IV. HOW WE GOT HERE: AN ABRIDGED HISTORY OF THE RIGHTS 
AMENDMENTS 
In the summer of 1787, Americans faced the task of revising a 
system of government that, under the Articles of Confederation, had 
brought the young Republic face to face with an enemy more dangerous 
than the British Empire it had defeated a decade earlier.  The threat was 
the prospect of internal collapse from a central government too weak to 
address problems so national in scope that attempts to deal with them 
from the parochial viewpoints of states only made them worse.136  But 
while more central authority was needed, excessive central authority was 
precisely what had spawned the Revolution in the first place.  Madison 
called this the “great difficulty” of creating the sublime paradox of a 
central government sufficiently enabled to serve the proper ends for 
which a national government was established while tolerably controlling 
it so that it would not suppress the personal liberties of citizens.137 
As of 1787, however, little or no thought was given to accomplishing 
this by writing a Bill of Rights.  The Articles of Confederation had 
none,138 and no delegate who came to the Convention had a Bill of 
Rights as their top priority.  A suggestion for one was only raised a few 
                                                     
 136. There are many excellent historical accounts of the circumstances leading to the call for a 
constitutional convention.  See, e.g., FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 115, at 18–31, 257–60; ALLAN 
NEVIS & HENRY STEELE COMMAGER, A POCKET HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 106–30 
(Washington Square Press 1960) (1942); THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION: A 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY (Michael Kammen ed., 1986) [hereinafter ORIGINS]; JACK N. RAKOVE, 
ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION (1996); DANIEL 
N. ROBINSON, AMERICAN IDEALS: FOUNDING A “REPUBLIC OF VIRTUE” 98–147 (2004); Paul 
Finkleman, The Paradox of Rights Rhetoric, in TO SECURE THE BLESSINGS OF LIBERTY: RIGHTS IN 
AMERICAN HISTORY 84–86 (Josephine F. Pacheco ed., 1993) [hereinafter BLESSINGS OF LIBERTY]. 
 137. See Bruce A. Antkowiak, The Ascent of an Ancient Palladium: The Resurgent Importance 
of Trial by Jury and the Coming Revolution in Pennsylvania Sentencing, 13 WIDENER L.J. 11, 27–28 
(2003) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 at 349 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)). 
 138. MCAFFEE ET AL., supra note 8, at 29. 
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days before adjournment and generated no interest.139  The original 
approach of the Framers was to use the language of process, creating a 
governmental structure that would, by its natural operation, limit 
government and, consequently, create for individuals a space in which 
they would be left alone. 
In prior articles, I have detailed the intriguing structural approach the 
Framers concocted to seek the sublime paradox.140  The concoction was 
premised on an insight about human nature that while virtue was a 
treasured attribute of political leaders, not all who sought political power 
would be virtuous.  The safer assumption was that they all would be 
ambitious and the best way to counteract ambition was with the 
counterweight of ambition for the same limited quantum of power.141 
This slightly sardonic view of human nature, and the teachings of 
David Hume and Adam Smith,142 led the Framers to make a “unique 
contribution” to “political science and political theory” by acting on the 
insight that “freedom was enhanced by the creation of two governments, 
not one.”143  They “split the atom of sovereignty,”144 dividing that portion 
                                                     
 139. FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 115, at 316–17; RAKOVE, supra note 136, at 288–89. 
 140. See Bruce A. Antkowiak, Contemplating Brazilian Federalism: Reflections on the Promise 
of Liberty, 43 DUQ. L. REV. 599, 609–21 (2005) [hereinafter Antkowiak, Contemplating Brazilian 
Federalism] (stating that the “federalist structure of joint sovereigns . . . assures a decentralized 
government that will be more sensitive to the diverse needs of a heterogeneous society”); 
Antkowiak, supra note 9, at 468–74 (stating that “[r]eason may have displaced an older, theological 
mandate as the philosophical force behind political society but it hardly stripped that society of its 
moral component: limited government did not mean an amoral one”); Bruce A. Antkowiak, Judicial 
Nullification, 38 CREIGHTON L. REV. 545, 572–74 (2005) (stating that “[w]ithin the spheres of 
authority properly demarcated for government action, such action enjoyed the full and proper range 
of human judgment including, of course, the ethical dimension”); Antkowiak, supra note 74, at 578–
82 (stating that the “Fourth Amendment protects a right to be let alone, a right . . . that reflects most 
particularly the government’s structural charge to perform tasks the Constitution delegates to it and, 
otherwise, to leave us alone”).  Scottish Enlightenment scholars have noted that great economic 
growth and the possibility of increasing numbers of people acquiring it were factors the Scots 
believed had profound effects on moral philosophy.  Knud Haakonssen, Natural Jurisprudence and 
the Theory of Justice, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION, supra note 11, at 217; Fania Oz-Salzberger, 
The Political Theory of the Scottish Enlightenment, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION, supra note 11, 
at 164–69.  Certainly, George Washington saw an American Empire coming.  JOSEPH J. ELLIS, 
AMERICAN CREATION: TRIUMPHS AND TRAGEDIES AT THE FOUNDING OF THE REPUBLIC 87–89 
(2007). 
 141. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison). 
 142. As Professor Wills and others have pointed out, it sometimes seemed as if Madison wrote 
his most celebrated works, including The Federalist No. 10, while he had the works of Hume opened 
beside him.  DOUGLAS ADAIR, “That Politics may be Reduced to a Science” David Hume, James 
Madison, and the Tenth Federalist, as reprinted in FAME AND THE FOUNDING FATHERS 98–104 
(Trevor Colbourn ed., 1974); WILLS, supra note 3, at 20–22. 
 143. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 575–76 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring).  To the 
extent that federalism in particular was meant to deal with the question of factions, Justice 
Kennedy’s observation should probably have acknowledged the contribution made by Hume and 
Smith whose influence on the writing of The Federalist No. 10 is plain.  See ELLIS, supra note 140, 
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of the socio-political universe to be ruled over by government into two 
spheres of authority, federal and state.  With ambitious people in both of 
those spheres, conflict was inevitable and anticipated.  Even more 
conflict was anticipated within the federal sphere where three co-equal 
branches would be in a constant state of dispute over the use of the 
power the federal government had been given.  Creating the most 
efficient government was not the ultimate goal—the sublime paradox 
was.  The part of that paradox that involved protecting individual liberty 
was addressed by a process that enumerated powers to be wielded by the 
central government and enforced that enumeration by the structures of 
federalism and separation of powers.  These would be the “double 
security” to the rights of the people.145  No meaningful effort was made 
to define or identify rights as stand alone quantities within the text of the 
Constitution itself.146 
In large measure, what our Framers initially envisioned was that 
rights would happen as the byproduct of a system of government of 
enumerated powers and be protected by the two great structural pillars,147 
                                                                                                                       
at 105–06 (“The ‘literary cargo’ of books Jefferson had sent [Madison] from Paris included the 
histories of David Hume, which contained an embryonic version of the idea that Madison might 
have picked up.”); Fleischacker, supra note 11, at 327–28 (stating that “like Smith, [Madison] sees 
the liberty that . . . gives rein to ‘interest’ as compatible with a republic concerned” with fostering 
virtue). 
 144. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 145. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison). 
 146. As Professor Rakove points out, the body of the Constitution does contain certain specific 
“rights” guarantees (such as habeas corpus, jury trial in criminal cases, the privileges and immunities 
protections of Article IV, the contracts clause, and the ban against religious tests for public office) 
but they were “piecemeal in composition and partial in coverage.”  RAKOVE, supra note 136, at 317–
18.  They were hardly the “natural rights” of the Declaration.  See id. (stating that “[n]one of these 
provisions invoked the natural rights and first principles that Americans expected a declaration of 
rights to contain”).  Indeed, a quick scan of the rights will show that they were all mostly useful in 
service of the structural protections the rest of the Constitution afforded.  For example, habeas 
corpus afforded the judiciary the authority to inquire into and check the executive’s assertion of the 
power to hold someone, and jury trial is the quintessential structural protection of liberty.  Bruce A. 
Antkowiak, The Art of Malice, 60 RUTGERS L. REV. 435, 462–64 (2008); Shannon C. Stimson, ‘A 
Jury of the Country’: Common Sense Philosophy and the Jurisprudence of James Wilson, in 
SCOTLAND AND AMERICA IN THE AGE OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT 193, 198–204 (Richard B. Sher & 
Jeffrey R. Smitten 1990) [hereinafter SCOTLAND AND AMERICA].  The privileges and immunities 
clause preserved basic guarantees of federalism against the corrosive force of state isolationism; the 
contracts clause limited state power generally; and, while the religious test ban comes closest to a 
stand alone “right” it did not guarantee freedom of religious practice as much as seek to remind all 
governments of the secular authority from which they originated.  See RAKOVE, supra note 136, at 
311–12 (stating that “at the heart of [Jefferson’s and Madison’s] support for disestablishment and 
free exercise lay the radical conviction that . . . religious practice could be safely deregulated, placed 
beyond the cognizance of the state, and thus defused as both a source of political strife and a danger 
to individual rights”). 
 147. See Antkowiak, Contemplating Brazilian Federalism, supra note 140, at 605–09 (stating 
that “each of [the] dual sovereigns must maintain political credibility since it is ‘in the tension 
 
0.6.0_ANTKOWIAK FINAL 2/9/2010  11:04:56 AM 
2010] THE RIGHTS QUESTION 645 
implemented by a judiciary with a broad and vigorous mandate.  In 
Federalist No. 78,148 Hamilton argued that the judiciary must be 
independent “to guard the Constitution and the rights of individuals from 
the effects of those ill humors which the arts of designing men . . . 
sometimes disseminate among the people themselves . . . [resulting in] 
serious oppressions of the minor party in the community.”149  It was the 
duty of judges to act “as faithful guardians of the Constitution, where 
legislative invasions of it had been instigated by the major voice of the 
community,”150 and they were to accomplish this by using “reason and 
law.”151  Rights did not need to be specified as they were simply what 
was left outside of those powers we specifically bestowed upon the 
central government.152  Rights were part of a process in which we 
enjoyed freedom from arbitrary, tyrannical power.153  Had we kept with 
the Framers’ original design, and had a Constitution without a Bill of 
Rights, answering the rights question would be a vastly different 
enterprise. 
Of course, we never let that original design get off the ground.  As 
brilliant as this plan of government may have been, it was politically 
unpalatable in the America of the late eighteenth century.  Like any 
radical new notion, it was viewed with a jaundiced eye.  A number of 
states appended calls for various amendments to their ratification 
                                                                                                                       
between federal and state power’ that ‘lies the promise of liberty’”). 
 148. James Wilson was an equally strong advocate for expansive judicial power, largely as an 
outgrowth of his admiration for the common sense philosophy of Thomas Reid.  Stimson, supra note 
146, at 199–204. 
 149. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 469 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
 150. Id. at 470. 
 151. Id. at 468.  Two excellent discussions of Hamilton’s treatment are contained in PECK, supra 
note 8, 65–67, and in WILLS, supra note 3, at 151. 
 152. See infra notes 156–58 and accompanying text for a discussion of Hamilton’s and Wilson’s 
opposition to a Bill of Rights. 
 153. This epitomized the concept of freedom defined by Philip Pettit in Freedom as 
Antipower: 
I am free to the degree that no human being has the power to interfere with me: to the 
extent that no one else is my master, even if I lack the will or the wisdom required for 
achieving self-mastery.  The account is negative in leaving my own achievements out of 
the picture and focusing on eliminating a danger from others. 
And he considered the best way to achieve it to be to 
consider the introduction of protective, regulatory, and empowering institutions.  I do not 
say that every institution will necessarily increase antipower, of course; some may have 
indirect, counter productive effects, and empirical work will be required to determine 
which mix of institutions does best.  I say only that protective, regulatory, and 
empowering institutions represent the sorts of options that we ought to be considering if 
we are interested in the promotion of antipower in a society. 
Antkowiak, supra note 74, at 580–81 (quoting Philip Pettit, Freedom as Antipower, 106 ETHICS 576, 
578, 590 (1996)). 
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resolutions,154 and Anti-Federalist thought, defeated in its general 
opposition to the Constitution, won out on the need for a listing of 
rights.155 
Hamilton and others argued stridently against including such a 
listing, warning that it could serve only as an instrument to limit political 
liberty by making it appear that the government could control all conduct 
outside such an enumeration.156  James Wilson feared that including a 
Bill of Rights would undercut the notion that “the Constitution was a 
bold statement that ‘we reserve the right to do as we please’ when 
specific authority for government action does not exist.”157  But in the 
realpolitick of the 1790s, Madison knew that to forestall a move for a 
second Constitutional Convention, he had to propose a Bill of Rights to 
the first Congress.158 
In advancing the Bill of Rights, though, Madison would do nothing 
that meant scraping the careful contours of the Constitution he had just 
helped author.  He became satisfied that enacting a Bill of Rights risked 
little insofar as the integrity of his governmental system was concerned.  
And on the plus side, a Bill could help educate and galvanize the 
                                                     
 154. These are very nicely collected for viewing at the website of the Avalon Project at the Yale 
Law School.  The Avalon Project, http://avalon.law.yale.edu (last visited Nov. 1, 2009). 
 155. Selected Anti-Federalist Writings 1787–1788, reprinted in ORIGINS, supra note 136, at 
291–94, 315–19, 369–71, 376–79; see also FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 115, at 321–23; ROBERT 
GOLDWIN, FROM PARCHMENT TO POWER: HOW JAMES MADISON USED THE BILL OF RIGHTS TO 
SAVE THE CONSTITUTION 58–59 (1997); PECK, supra note 8, at 60–67; see generally RICHARD 
LABUNSKI, JAMES MADISON AND THE STRUGGLE FOR THE BILL OF RIGHTS (2006). 
 156. Professor Rakove quotes Benjamin Rush as observing that, “Our rights are not yet all 
known . . . how could they be properly enumerated?” and Noah Webster as lampooning the whole 
idea that a Bill of Rights could ever be effective. RAKOVE, supra note 136, at 327–30.  See also 
MCAFFEE, supra note 16, at 140–42; PECK, supra note 8, 63–64.  Elsewhere, I have written: 
When the product of the Philadelphia Convention was assailed for failing to include a list 
of rights, Hamilton called a listing “unnecessary” because under our constitution, unlike 
the English system, “in strictness, the people surrender nothing.”  A listing was 
“dangerous” because it could leave future generations to wonder if the list was by way of 
limitation of rights when, in fact, the Constitution itself was itself a bill of rights, 
reserving to the individual all that had not been specifically delegated away. 
Bruce A. Antkowiak, The Irresistible Force, 18 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 1, 33 (2008) 
(footnote omitted). 
 157. See id. at 33 n.266 (quoting The Debates in the Convention of the State of Pennsylvania on 
the Adoption of the Federal Constitution (1787)).  As the discussion on the Ninth Amendment 
indicates, there is a considerable body of scholarly thought that Madison included the provision not 
to invite broad Court intervention into the rights business but as a structural guarantee against the 
interpretation Hamilton, Wilson and others feared.  See AKHIL AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A 
BIOGRAPHY 327–29 (2005); MCAFFEE, supra note 16, at 2–3, 84, 147, 170–73; MCAFFEE ET AL., 
supra note 8, at 226–37.  See generally KURT I. LASH, THE LOST HISTORY OF THE NINTH 
AMENDMENT 13–38 (Oxford Press 2009). 
 158. He made that proposal the day before another House Member was going to present a 
resolution for a new constitutional convention.  GOLDWIN, supra note 155, at 76–80. 
0.6.0_ANTKOWIAK FINAL 2/9/2010  11:04:56 AM 
2010] THE RIGHTS QUESTION 647 
populace over certain principles and prevent the gradual expansion of 
government by enabling courts to see themselves as, according to 
Madison, “an impenetrable bulwark against” usurpations of power by the 
executive or legislature.159  All in all, he said, we have “something to 
gain, and, if we proceed with caution, nothing to lose.”160 
Madison did not, however, see the Bill of Rights as doing much to 
abate the real danger to individual liberty that loomed.  The structure of 
the republic he devised—with wise advice from Hume and Smith—
would deal on the federal level with the greatest threat of oppression that 
he believed existed, oppression from a majority.161  A republic in a large 
geographic area was best suited to deal with the pernicious tendency of 
factions to coalesce as majorities and suppress minority rights and 
viewpoints.162  But, in pockets of that geographic expanse that was the 
states, such oppression was highly probable.163 
Madison’s initial solution to this problem was to use Congress, not 
the judiciary, as the oversight mechanism.  At the Philadelphia 
Convention, he proposed that Congress have the power to veto any state 
law, but all he could achieve was the Supremacy Clause.164  It was not 
until the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment forty-four years after his 
death that some direct federal oversight of a state’s potential to oppress a 
minority point of view became possible.165 
                                                     
 159. RAKOVE, supra note 136, at 332–35; see also GOLDWIN, supra note 155 at 76–80, 92; 
PECK, supra note 8, at 4–5. 
 160. See GOLDWIN, supra note 155, at 80. 
 161. ELLIS, supra note 140, at 105–07; FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 115, at 191–92; 
GOLDWIN, supra note 155, at 63–68; RAKOVE, supra note 136, at 313–16 (arguing that Madison’s 
greatest fear was that states would attack property rights); Finkleman, supra note 136, at 99–100. 
 162. ADAIR, supra note 142, at 98–106; ELLIS, supra note 140, at 105–06; GOLDWIN, supra note 
155, at 63; RAKOVE, supra note 136, at 332.  A detailed explanation of this influence is set forth by 
Professor Branson.  See Roy Branson, James Madison and the Scottish Enlightenment, 40 J. HIST. OF 
IDEAS 235, 246–50 (1979). 
 163. State constitutional rights provisions were seen as useless to prevent such oppression.  At 
times, they read like mere exhortations or statements of broad principles, using the word “ought” 
instead of language setting clear boundaries of authority; at all times, they were the products of state 
legislatures that were free to change them by a mere legislative act.  MCAFFEE, supra note 16, at 19–
26; RAKOVE, supra note 136, at 306.  Moreover, state governments were viewed as having general 
police power for the health, safety and welfare of the community, a power to be checked by popular 
sovereignty more than by state courts which could not find in any of their constitutions an explicit 
power of judicial review.  MCAFFEE, supra note 16, at 26. 
 164. ELLIS, supra note 140, at 112, 118; GOLDWIN, supra note 155, at 59; MCAFFEE, supra note 
16, at 49. 
 165. Some historians have seen the Fourteenth Amendment as the last chapter in Madison’s 
legacy.  GOLDWIN, supra note 155, at 59; RAKOVE, supra note 136, at 338. 
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Exactly how much and what sort of oversight the drafters of that 
Amendment foresaw is a matter of considerable debate.166  What may be 
gleaned from a brief review of the Fourteenth Amendment’s history is 
that there was no definitive understanding by those who framed and 
ratified it about how it would treat the rights question under the 
Constitution.167  It focused on the concept of equality before the law and 
did not intend to radically upset notions of local self-rule and 
federalism.168  Federalism was still considered a “bulwark of liberty” and 
whether the Amendment—as first proposed—would simply grant power 
to Congress to enforce equality through legislation,169 or—as it was 
passed—allow for the Court to enforce it as well, there appears to be 
little evidence that it was understood to be a broad mandate for the 
identification of new rights not theretofore in the vocabulary of the 
law.170 
The simplest explanation [of the Amendment], which was repeated 
continually during the congressional and state ratification debates, was 
that the amendment did not protect specific fundamental rights or give 
Congress and the federal courts power to interfere with state 
lawmaking that either created or denied rights.  The only effect of the 
amendment was to prevent the states from discriminating arbitrarily 
between different classes of citizens. As long as the state treated its 
citizens equally . . . the state would remain immune from federal 
intervention pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment.171 
Through the latter part of the nineteenth century and into the early 
decades of the twentieth, the consensus was that states were to determine 
                                                     
 166. See WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO 
JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 1–4 (1988) (discussing the various scholarly interpretations of the Fourteenth 
Amendment). 
 167. See id. at 60–61, 114–22, 123–24, 146.  As noted earlier, there was debate from the outset 
about whether it would operate to incorporate all of the first eight amendments against the states.  
See id. at 155–96 (expanding on the debate over incorporation). 
 168. Id. at 8–9. 
 169. See id. at 49–55 (discussing the Fourteenth Amendment’s implications for congressional 
powers).  The change to permit the Supreme Court to enforce it seems to have occurred when the 
Republicans who supported the Amendment realized that they may be voted out of office at some 
point, leaving enforcement to their rivals whose vigor to enforce equality was tempered, to say the 
least.  Id. at 111–13. 
 170. See id. at 115 (explaining that the purported effect was to prevent arbitrary discrimination). 
 171. Id. at 115.  Professor Nelson argues that the “liberty” to be protected by the Amendment 
was a function of three components: a “higher law” which all parties to any debate could invoke 
with equal apparent force, rendering resorting to “higher law” a nullity; the liberty that flowed from 
the fact that we lived under a republic, this being one of the first principles of the social compact 
idea of Justice Chase; and, the liberty we enjoyed as the result of federalism and the structural 
protections it provided.  Id. at 21–31.  The last two of these are clearly structural concepts in the 
tradition of the original plan of the Constitution.  Id. 
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the rights of their citizens and that the Amendment only required that 
they confer them equally, that is, in a reasonable way.172  That view not 
only finds voice in Hurtado, but in more recent cases in which the Court 
defeated claims of liberty interests essentially in the name of 
federalism.173 
This history raises a significant question.  Assume that Madison’s 
expectations for the Bill of Rights were modest,174 and that the 
Fourteenth Amendment was only projected to seek equality in 
application of rights and not the definition of the rights themselves.175  
                                                     
 172. See id. at 151–64, 175–76, 180–81. 
 173. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County, 489 U.S. 189 (1989).  In DeShaney, a little boy who 
was neglected by state child-welfare agents while he was under their jurisdiction resulted in him 
being beaten viciously by his abusive father; the Court rejected the assertion that such neglect 
amounted to a denial of his liberty interest in personal security.  Id. at 195.  The Constitution does 
not put upon states an affirmative obligation to ensure life, liberty or property, the Court said, only to 
protect against intrusions of these by the state itself.  Id. at 196.  Any argument that the state would 
have liability by voluntarily undertaking to protect the boy would have to be addressed to the state 
courts or legislators in the context of tort law, the Court concluded, but for constitutional purposes, 
the State owed the child nothing.  Id. at 201–02. 
In Town of Castlerock v. Gonzales, the police failed to enforce a restraining order even though 
they had probable cause to believe a violent father had violated it by snatching his children from a 
playground.  545 U.S. 748, 753–54 (2005).  He shot the children before dying in a shoot out with the 
police when he drove to the police station.  Id. at 754.  The plaintiff this time asserted a “property” 
interest in having the Court order properly enforced but, after reference to state law principles, the 
United States Supreme Court found no sustainable property right to be enforced.  Id. at 756–57.  
And, even if there was some reasonable expectation that an order would be enforced, the Supreme 
Court found that expectation not like a “traditional conception of property” cognizable under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  Id. at 766. 
Most recently, the Supreme Court rejected a claim by an Alaskan prisoner that due process 
required the State to give him access to a critical piece of evidence used to convict him so that he 
could conduct DNA tests on it using techniques not available at his trial that could prove his long-
asserted innocence.  Dist. Att’y’s Office for the Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 2308, 
2316 (2009).  “The dilemma [of] how to harness DNA’s power to prove innocence without 
unnecessarily overthrowing the established system of criminal justice” is, according to the Court, a 
“task [that] belongs primarily to the legislature.”  Id. at 2317.  That the Alaska legislature had not 
gotten around to that matter, however, was of little importance as the Court believed its only task 
was to determine whether the somewhat uncertain post-conviction remedies the defendant did have 
offended “some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be 
ranked as fundamental.”  Id. at 2320 (quoting Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 446 (1993)).  
Finding that the remedies were adequate, the Court then declined to hold that there was a substantive 
due process “right” to have a DNA analysis even when it could exonerate an innocent person 
because, evidently, the Court has “always been reluctant to expand the concept of substantive due 
process because guideposts for responsible decision making in this unchartered area are scarce and 
open-ended.”  Id. at 2322 (quoting Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992)).  
Indeed, given that DNA testing is so recent, there hardly can be a “tradition” of it to elevate and 
elevating it would serve to pre-empt state legislative actions that should be given deference.  Id. at 
2323. 
 174. See GOLDWIN, supra note 155, at 71–80 (explaining how Madison persuaded himself to 
support the Bill of Rights); RAKOVE, supra note 136, at 332 (explaining Madison’s doubts about the 
Bill of Rights). 
 175. NELSON, supra note 166, at 115–23. 
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Add that these limited expectations were initially realized, as there were 
relatively few cases litigating these Amendments well into the twentieth 
century.176  As Justice Scalia remarked, many provisions of the Bill of 
Rights “remained unilluminated” for long periods of time as sometimes 
questions about them simply did not present themselves.177  So why all 
the presentation in the last half century?  What explains the prominence 
and high expectations we now hold for these Amendments?  Perhaps part 
of coming to a sensible answer to the rights question involves 
understanding why we have felt the need to illuminate rights in this era 
of our history. 
As we are engaged in a preliminary expedition of these critical 
matters, let me set forth a working hypothesis.  America underwent 
fundamental, perhaps cataclysmic, changes beginning after the Civil 
War.  Those changes profoundly challenged one of the great assumptions 
Madison and others made about the efficacy of structure in protecting 
that which we call “rights.”  Consider the sequence of events occurring 
after 1865: the Industrial Revolution and the massive immigration and 
the shifting of population centers to major cities it begat, the First World 
War, the Great Depression, the Second World War, the Cold War, the 
explosion of technology that increasingly links world cultures and 
economies (globalization), and international terrorism.  Each of these 
standing alone was an event that seemed to compel a massive expansion 
of governmental power generally and, as the scope of each problem far 
exceeded the boundary of any state, invited the jurisdiction of the federal 
government to grow in geometric terms.  When seen collectively, these 
events created a rising tide of federal authority that seriously called into 
question whether federalism remains a viable structural instrument to 
limit the power of government generally.  While we do love our 
federalism and we always have,178 can it possibly be expected to stand as 
a pillar of limited government against this relentless march of time? 
If these dynamic forces of history have made us doubt the efficacy of 
federalism, or made us believe that the United States must exercise 
                                                     
 176. Professor Belz identifies only nine Supreme Court cases dealing with the first eight 
amendments through the nineteenth century.  Herman Belz, Written or Unwritten: Is the Bill of 
Rights Adequate? Historical Reflection and Constitutional Criticism, in BLESSINGS OF LIBERTY, 
supra note 136, at 145, 151.  A search on Westlaw for Supreme Court cases mentioning the first 
eight amendments will garner approximately 812 cases before 1945, while the same search from 
1945 onwards results in approximately 3,342 cases. 
 177. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2816 (2008). 
 178. See Antkowiak, Contemplating Brazilian Federalism, supra note 140, at 602 (“We see 
federalism as arising as part of the core act of genius of the Constitutional scheme.”); Branson, supra 
note 162, at 250 (arguing that Madison’s The Federalist No. 51 is his ode to structure as the true 
bulwark for freedom). 
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general police power to deal effectively as a member of an integrated 
community of nations, might the Supreme Court have subtly decided that 
only by exerting a more vigorous role in interpreting the rights question 
could it fulfill its role per Hamilton’s Federalist No. 78 or meet the threat 
Madison feared the most: the oppression of the majority? 
Whether this hypothesis will withstand further scrutiny or be 
adjudged a fatal oversimplification, it is clear that the Court will forge 
ahead to answer the rights question.  Hopefully, in so doing, it will carve 
out some measure of respect for individuals consistent within the ever-
elusive sublime paradox.  But as of now, the confused state of its efforts 
threaten to be counter-productive.  They do not need to be.  James 
Wilson said “that of all governments, those are the best, which, by the 
natural effect of their constitutions, are frequently renewed or drawn 
back to their first principles.”179  If we believe that our government is still 
one of the best, then drawing back to our first principles is the logical 
way to ease the confusion. 
V. GOING ON FROM HERE: HINTS AT A WAY OUT OF THE THICKET 
A. Hint #1: Know Thyself 
A good place to start is to recognize that “we,” the vanguard of that 
search, are lawyers.  While theologians and philosophers relish 
languages like “rights-speak,” we lawyers do not.  The “mother tongue” 
of lawyers is not English.  It is the language of justice by process. 
All jokes about us to one side, we are a humble group who do not 
pretend that we see “justice” as a stand-alone commodity in the heavens 
to be brought to earth by some transcendent act of our rhetorical 
reasoning.  Justice happens not because we divine the just outcome 
intuitively, but because we have fashioned a process we trust that will 
likely bring it about.  We set elements of crimes, fashion rules of 
evidence and procedure to structure our trials, and define a degree of 
certainty necessary to validate the final outcome of the litigation.  But 
when we have done all of that and have conducted our “fair” trial, we 
walk away telling a group of non-lawyers to go into a room, take what 
our process has given them, and come out with justice.  Just as we do not 
presume to define justice apart from the process that leads to it, we are 
uncomfortable speaking of rights as free-standing nouns in the political 
universe, preferring instead to use them as verbs to animate parts of our 
                                                     
 179. Stimson, supra note 146, at 193. 
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process.  We validate that process simply by the ongoing, deep-seated 
consensus of the people who live with it. 
But when the lawyers on the Supreme Court face the “rights 
question,” they lapse into “rights-speak,” and “rights” become nouns.  
They speak of them as stand alone, transcendent “things” existing apart 
from our “process.”  They deem themselves capable of divining absolute 
sources from which the “things” came and validate their act of divination 
by invoking equally absolute paradigms.  In doing so, the Court forgets 
that its very authority to act at all derives not from the cosmos, but from 
a document that is the first product of an earth-bound democracy and 
begins with “we the people.”  The Court forgets that the Constitutional 
Convention was in Philadelphia, not on Olympus. 
Like anyone who tries to speak a language they have not mastered, 
the Court ends up spewing gibberish.  However, there is no reason to 
despair.  The Constitution was more the work of able lawyers than 
platonic guardians, and we all are more than capable of answering the 
rights question it poses.180  However, we must consider taking advice 
from those who taught the able lawyers who put the question there 
initially.  We might even find that they spoke a language we can readily 
understand. 
B. Hint #2: Listen to the Men Who Framed the Framers 
To understand Madison’s Bill of Rights, and indeed, his whole 
Constitution, we must do as he did and become students of the Scottish 
Enlightenment.  The influence of David Hume, Adam Smith and others 
on the writing of the American Constitution is well documented.181  
Leading scholars have called the Scottish Enlightenment Scotland’s chief 
export to the United States and have called our Founders better readers of 
Scottish writers than any of their contemporaries in Europe.182  Scotland 
was the center of “eighteenth-century social science research and 
                                                     
 180. Historian Douglas Adair quotes fellow historian Vernon Paddington as arguing that the 
Constitution was the work of “able lawyers,” not political philosophers.  ADAIR, supra note 142, at 
127. 
 181. See MICHAEL FRY, HOW THE SCOTS MADE AMERICA (2005); ALEXANDER LESLIE 
KLIEFORTH & ROBERT JOHN MUNRO, THE SCOTTISH INVENTION OF AMERICA, DEMOCRACY AND 
HUMAN RIGHTS: THE HISTORY OF LIBERTY AND FREEDOM FROM THE ANCIENT CELTS TO THE NEW 
MILLENNIUM 269–71 (2004); ROBINSON, supra note 136, at 125–27; GARY WILLS, INVENTING 
AMERICA: JEFFERSON’S DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 207–17 (1978); WILLS, supra note 3, at 
13–23; Fleischacker, supra note 11, at 317–20. 
 182. Alexander Broadie, Introduction to THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION, supra note 11, at 6; Oz-
Salzberger, supra note 140. 
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publication in all the world”183 and Madison was “[t]he most creative and 
philosophical disciple of the Scottish school of science and politics.”184  
Madison’s formal exposure to Hume and others began at Princeton 
where he studied under the great Scottish teacher, John Witherspoon.185  
In the summer before the Convention, Madison absorbed the writings of 
Hume and Smith in a collection Jefferson shipped to him from Paris.186  
These studies resulted in the profound influence Hume had on Madison 
in the grand concept of a large republic’s capacity to deal with factions, 
embodied in Federalist No. 10.187 
While we have no body of writings like the Federalist Papers to 
guide us through the philosophical foundation of the Bill of Rights—or, 
for that matter, the Fourteenth Amendment that extended it188—it is 
unlikely that Madison and others disregarded all they learned from the 
Scots when they put the language of the rights question into the 
Constitution.  But tracing those influences just to find a curious thread of 
intellectual history is secondary to the search for a better way to interpret 
critical passages of a constitution not entwined in a dangerous thicket of 
interpretation.  By appreciating the intellectual foundation of the men 
who posed the rights question, we may be inspired to find a clearer path 
to answering it. 
Before going further, though, I need to remind the reader of my 
initial admonition that this paper is the scouting party of a larger 
expedition into an area that requires more room for explication than any 
law review can provide.  The Scottish Enlightenment was not just Hume 
and Smith—its “common sense” school of Thomas Reid, Francis 
Hutcheson and others attracted the allegiance of many influential 
Framers189—and no attempt at anything like a comprehensive synthesis 
                                                     
 183. ADAIR, supra note 142, at 95. 
 184. Id. at 97. 
 185. Witherspoon’s presence in America was yet another contribution made to the nation by 
Benjamin Rush who recruited Witherspoon to the post at Princeton from Edinburgh.  Witherspoon 
puts all other teachers to shame in terms of the accomplishments of his students.  He instructed a 
President, a Vice President, twenty-one Senators, twenty-nine House Members, twelve governors, 
fifty-six state legislators, thirty-three judges (three of whom ascended to the Supreme Court), and 
various founders of other colleges, ministers and authors.  WILLS, supra note 3, at 18.  Once 
Madison arrived in Philadelphia in 1787 he was joined by eight other Witherspoon-Princeton 
alumni.  Id. at 6–7, 15.  For additional reference to Hume’s influence on other Founders, see Werner, 
supra note 12, at 453–54. 
 186. ELLIS, supra note 140, at 101–05. 
 187. Adair masterfully documents Hume’s tremendous impact on this critical Federalist Paper.  
ADAIR, supra note 142, at 98–106. 
 188. NELSON, supra note 166, at 60–61, 123–24. 
 189. Madison was taken by Hume and Smith, James Wilson by Reid, and Jefferson, at least in 
his moral philosophy, paid homage to Hutcheson.  Fleischacker, supra note 11, at 317–20; see also 
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of either school is possible here.  My purpose now is only to suggest that 
even a cursory review of the key points of the Scot’s teachings suggest 
why they appealed to those who first placed rights into an American 
context and why we must study the Scots further today. 
First, the Scots were children of Isaac Newton.  The science Newton 
uncovered made the world knowable by an empirical, analytic approach 
in which all people, not just those who claimed some special revelation, 
could access an ever unfolding cascade of truth.190  Hume was 
profoundly affected by this, realizing at an early age that he was not the 
kind of man disposed to submit to any authority and that he needed a 
“new medium to establish truth.”191  He found it in Newton and Francis 
Bacon, and the science of thought using empirical analysis.192  In politics, 
Hume concluded that absolutes did not exist and that with the use of a 
proper process, the science of politics would allow the gradual, 
evolutionary unfolding of knowledge.193 
The Scots also agreed “on the sociability of human nature, on the 
importance of history to moral philosophy and social science, [and] on 
the dignity and intelligence of ordinary people . . . .”194  The emphasis on 
man’s sociability did not detract from the fact that the individual’s 
happiness remained the final mark of a well-functioning society.195  
While Hume disagreed with Locke on states of nature and social 
contracts,196 he and other Scots agreed with Locke that government’s 
primary function was to “protect certain conditions for individual 
liberty” rather than to lead the populace to some higher plane of 
“religious or moral virtue.”197 
But as our Framers carefully studied the Scots for advice on how to 
protect those “certain conditions,” they would have found little that 
                                                                                                                       
KLIEFORTH & MUNRO, supra note 181, at 269–71.  The influence of Thomas Reid on fellow Scot 
James Wilson pervaded Wilson’s advocacy of bicameralism, wide powers for juries, and a Supreme 
Court empowered to carry out the broad principles of the common sense philosophy.  Stimson, supra 
note 146, at 200–06.  Wilson quoted Reid in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (1 Dall.) 419, 453 (1798), 
and Chief Justice John Marshall echoed Wilson’s ideals.  Id. at 205–06.  Overall, an outstanding 
compilation of Scottish thought may be found in Alexander Broadie, A HISTORY OF SCOTTISH 
PHILOSOPHY (2009). 
 190. GRENZ, supra note 10, at 66–71; Alexander Broadie, The human mind and its powers, in 
THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION, supra note 11, at 60, 60–62; Broadie, supra note 182, at 1. 
 191. BUCHAN, supra note 4, at 77. 
 192. Id. at 79. 
 193. Oz-Salzberger, supra note 140, at 160–62; Werner, supra note 12, at 440. 
 194. Fleischacker, supra note 11, at 333. 
 195. Id. at 323. 
 196. HUME, Of the Original Contract, in ESSAYS, supra note 3, at 443, 443–44. 
 197. Fleischacker, supra note 11, at 321–23.  Politics was thus to have a liberal, not “Christian or 
civic republican” orientation.  Id. 
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motivated them to write a Bill of Rights.  This was because none of the 
Scots made rights central to their major lines of argument.198  What 
mattered more was justice—what Madison may have learned from Hume 
and Smith on that issue may help explain how Madison likely viewed the 
rights question we still face. 
For Hume, justice was not a transcendent entity.  It was an “artificial 
virtue” to be discovered by a critical analysis of how life operated well in 
practice.199 
Humanity by luck, chance and necessity falls upon certain forms of 
behaviour, such as trusting strangers with one’s goods.  As such 
behaviour ‘works’—i.e. serves the self-interest of most members of the 
group in question and thus the ‘public interest’ of the group as a 
whole—it becomes an observable pattern of behaviour.  This will tend 
to be seen as a rule which can be the object of common sentiments of 
regard, moral sentiments.200 
Hume’s justice was a process that originated “solely in social 
convention” and is validated entirely by “utility.”201  The “rules” we 
enforce are ones a broad-based consensus deem necessary to preserve 
conduct conducive to the life of the species.202  A constitution under 
Hume’s vision embodies that same, ongoing consensus: 
Hume did not conceive of the constitution as a timeless substance.  For 
Hume, the human world is an order of evolving conventions.  Such 
conventions are not the result of a contract or of any conscious 
planning.  Like a natural language, they evolve spontaneously over 
time to satisfy human needs.  The moral and legal rules of a political 
constitution are like the rules of English grammar: a formal expression 
of what has evolved unreflectively over time and is open to still further 
evolution.203 
Because the skeptical Hume rejected a “moralistic [or] legalistic” view of 
the world,204 he saw rights in a whole other perspective.  They were 
simply “formal expressions of social utilities in evolving conventions” 
                                                     
 198. Haakonssen, supra note 140, at 214–15. 
 199. Id. at 211. 
 200. Id. 
 201. John W. Cairns, Legal Theory, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION, supra note 11, at 222, 
231–32. 
 202. See id. (“Hume thought that rules for the allocation of the scarce resources necessary for 
life developed out of customary practices on the basis of expediency and necessity.”). 
 203. Donald W. Livingston, Hume, English Barbarism and American Independence, in 
SCOTLAND AND AMERICA, supra note 146, at 133, 137. 
 204. Id. at 138. 
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and by viewing them in this way, he focused on and understood more 
about how constitutions actually worked—that is, their process.205 
Hume would have taught Madison that rights were not a static 
phenomenon, fixed in time and immune from fundamental changes in 
society occurring around them.206  To hunters and gatherers, for example, 
property rights were meaningless, but to a new commercial and 
professional class, they were of real importance.207  Hume would never 
embrace a rights analysis that ignored the dynamic forces of history and 
sought to conjure up immutable truths from a mythical social contract.208  
Hume’s justice was based on social conventions that evolve just as the 
people whose consensus creates those conventions evolve; after all, no 
proper political system could be fashioned “by a people, who know not 
how to make a spinning-wheel, or to employ a loom to advantage.”209  
When those people discard the superstitions of “ignorant ages . . . which 
throws the government off its bias, and disturbs men in the pursuit of 
their interest and happiness,”210 government must be ready to effect that 
change of view. 
In studying Adam Smith, Madison would have again learned that 
justice was without transcendent origin.  He also would have received a 
glimpse of how the underlying consensus upon which justice, and rights, 
could be recognized.  Smith’s justice did not come about from a process 
that relied on some innate moral sense or reason.  The process of justice 
is a reflective one that starts with our perceiving the interaction of others.  
In so doing, we assess whether one was wronged by another and if they 
should have some recourse to right that wrong.211  From this assessment, 
we begin to contemplate principles by which we may judge our own 
conduct.212  However, because self-interest will tend to allow us to 
excuse our own conduct when we might be the one to be condemned or 
exaggerate the wrong if we were the victim, we find that validating these 
principles requires us to “invoke the judgment not of conscience—such 
as might operate on a desert island—but of society itself.  Aware of what 
our society thinks, we become spectators of our own appearance and 
behavior, and make our judgments of both.”213 
                                                     
 205. Id. 
 206. See Haakonssen, supra note 140, at 217 (“rights were temporal and historical phenomena”). 
 207. Id. 
 208. See Oz-Salzberger, supra note 140, at 164–69. 
 209. HUME, supra note 3, at 303. 
 210. Id. 
 211. Cairns, supra note 201, at 233. 
 212. BUCHAN, supra note 4, at 136–37. 
 213. Id. at 137. 
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But Smith recognized that society itself may, in the passions of a 
given moment, be as imprecise a guide for conduct as we are ourselves.  
Something even more objective, although no less earth-bound, was 
needed as a guide to the rules we would write.  Ultimately, he thought, 
we must 
submit not only to the actual judgment of our peers but also to a higher 
instance, “the supposed impartial and well-informed spectator, to that 
of a man within the breast.”  This “man within,” a collection of general 
rules about what is to be done and what avoided, is a balance to worldly 
misjudgment and our own self-delusion.214 
The “impartial spectator” looks upon the interaction of others from a 
“third standpoint of absolute neutrality” but he is not a man, or even a 
noun, at all.  The spectator is a process whereby we continually refine an 
ongoing, deeply held societal consensus that proceeds by asking how a 
truly neutral person would judge a situation, giving due consideration to 
the particular circumstances of each of the people involved.  The process 
becomes a “continual weeding out of behavior which is incompatible 
with social life.”215 
Smith advised that the power to determine the view of the impartial 
spectator should be vested in courts, who he thought were best able to 
discern the underlying principles of this consensus on a case-by-case 
basis.216  They could best recognize that justice is a “negative virtue,” 217 
that is, the virtue of the omission of injury,218 and, importantly, they 
could see how the notion of “rights” flowed naturally from it: 
The negative virtue of avoiding harm or injury was justice, which was 
the foundation of law and the subject of jurisprudence.  The personal 
attributes and actions that are protected in each person when others 
show them justice, i.e. abstain from injuring them, are their rights.  A 
right is a sphere of freedom to be or do or have something that the 
individual can maintain against all others because the spectatorial  
 
                                                     
 214. Id. at 137–38 (footnote omitted). 
 215. KNUD HAAKONSSEN, THE SCIENCE OF A LEGISLATOR: THE NATURAL JURISPRUDENCE OF 
DAVID HUME AND ADAM SMITH, 58–59 (1981).  The process is much like John Rawls’s act of 
negotiation behind the veil when people, coming together to form a society, negotiate rules for it not 
knowing who they will be once a “veil” is lifted and society begins.  I have discussed Rawls 
extensively in Antkowiak, supra note 74, at 594–606. 
 216. BUCHAN, supra note 4, at 136; Cairns, supra note 201, at 233. 
 217. Haakonssen, supra note 140, at 215. 
 218. Id. at 215–16. 
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resentment of infringement of this sphere is so strong that it has been 
institutionalized in the form of the legal system.219 
While it might be assumed that people would always agree on a core 
group of rights “common to all social living,” all rights beyond that were 
“dependent upon the spectatorial recognition in social intercourse.”220  
Rights would evolve, like the people whose deep, societal consensus 
animated and validated them. 
If this brief sketch of Scottish Enlightenment thought is accurate, 
then it is not surprising that a Bill of Rights was not on the agenda in 
Philadelphia or that it came about as a political compromise necessary to 
ratify the main document.  There is much to suggest that passing the Bill 
of Rights did not reflect a change in the fundamental view that “rights” 
were part of a constitutional process that sought “justice” in the present 
of every generation which embraced it.  “Rights” were not stand-alone, 
transcendent entities that only Princeton graduates could recognize. 
That the Framers from time to time spoke of “inalienable rights” did 
not mean that they deemed themselves beneficiaries of divine revelation.  
Indeed, reference to inalienable rights was made most commonly to 
refute the assertion that monarchs could wield power without popular 
assent based upon some divine, transcendently revealed authority.  The 
foremost “natural” right, one that was self-evident, was that no one had 
the right to assume power over others by transcendent edict alone.221 
Indeed, the Framers did not seriously suggest that anything they 
specified in the Constitution or its first set of amendments was a right of 
supernatural origin.222  Consider this simple point: neither the 
Constitution nor the Bill of Rights recognized any rights that the 
amendment process could not change or abolish if a consensus of the 
                                                     
 219. Id. at 216. 
 220. Id. 
 221. See FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 115, at 219–21.  Professor Kenyon traces the natural 
right theory to the Protestant Reformation, arguing that once theology espoused the idea that each 
person had to face God alone and without the necessity of an earth-bound intervener in the person of 
the Church, the notion that any earthly ruler could hold sway by the hand of God was soon to lose 
favor.  See John P. Kenyon, Rights: Where Did the Concept of Rights Come From?, in BLESSINGS 
OF LIBERTY, supra note 136, at 21, 26–27. 
 222. See generally FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 115, at 219–45 (discussing the events leading 
to the inclusion of the Bill of Rights in the Constitution).  Whether they were devout Christians, 
deists, or skeptical devotees of Hume, enacting a Constitution and Bill of Rights that overtly 
accepted the institution of slavery and was indifferent to the systematic marginalization of women 
and others in the political process would be an odd profession of faith.  Indeed, Professor McAffee 
points out that the Virginia Declaration of Rights was carefully crafted to avoid giving such rights to 
slaves.  MCAFFEE, supra note 16, at 18. 
0.6.0_ANTKOWIAK FINAL 2/9/2010  11:04:56 AM 
2010] THE RIGHTS QUESTION 659 
present generation sought to do so.223  Truly inalienable rights would be 
absolute and inviolable, but the Framers allowed each generation to 
accept or reject them based on the demands of the present.  In Thomas 
Paine’s words, the Framers would not engage in the “vanity and 
presumption of governing beyond the grave.”224  Rights were creatures 
we created for reasons of governance; they were thought to neither 
“proceed from, nor have any warrant in, the Divine Will.”225 
Neither were the Framers to be slaves of history.  Their physical 
separation from England freed the Framers from the “dead hand of the 
past” and traditions that were, while insightful, not controlling.226  In like 
manner, the Framers freed their heirs from the idea that their practices or 
observations about the Constitution were compulsory traditions or 
interpretive gospel.227  They recognized that they had achieved no 
consensus about how to interpret the Constitution228 and that they were 
about to consign it to a common-law system of interpretation that 
extracted principles from precedent, but made them applicable to 
evolving contemporary problems.229  The Constitution was to become a 
“‘child of fortune,’”230 the principles of which courts would 
“liquidate”231 over time using “reason and law.”232 
                                                     
 223. MCAFFEE, supra note 16, at 22–23, 124–25; see also RAKOVE, supra note 136, at 290–91 
(stating that the distinction between inalienable and alienable nights “was more theoretical than 
practical” and that a state could essentially regulate any right, “if its actions met requirements of 
law”); Noah Webster, On the Absurdity of a Bill of Rights, AMERICAN MAGAZINE, Dec. 1787, 
reprinted in INTERPRETING PRIMARY DOCUMENTS: THE BILL OF RIGHTS 31, 33–35 (Tom Head ed., 
2004) (arguing that having “a standing Bill of Rights is absurd” because, under a free government, 
no constitutions are unalterable). 
 224. THOMAS PAINE, RIGHTS OF MAN 41–42 (Penguin Books 1985) (1791).  Jefferson also 
believed that all laws should expire every nineteen years so that each new generation could govern 
anew.  Branson, supra note 162, at 238. 
 225. PECK, supra note 8, at 161 (quoting LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 2–3 (1958)). 
 226. ELLIS, supra note 140, at 16. 
 227. FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 115, at 377–79; PECK, supra note 8, at 168 (observing that 
the convention members did not advocate the publication of their journals until after the ratification 
votes and that Madison published his posthumously); see also RAKOVE, supra note 136, at 340–41 
(noting that the prevailing interpretive norm in the late 1780s focused almost exclusively on “the 
explicit language of a legal text” and did not equate “intention with the subjective purposes of 
identifiable historical actors”). 
 228. See FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 115, at 377–79. 
 229. See RAKOVE, supra note 136, at 341 (stating that early interpreters of the Constitution 
would have relied primarily on “rules and precedents of common-law adjudication”). 
 230. ELLIS, supra note 140, at 111. 
 231. Both Madison and Hamilton were fond of this term, although they may owe its use to 
Hume.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 468 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); WILLS, 
supra note 3, at 53–54. 
 232. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 468. 
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The teachings of the Scots on these matters appear to have resonated 
particularly in Madison who, in terms of constitutional interpretation, 
supported “a very adaptable and flexible instrument reflecting the needs 
of social man.  This test of utility is what we might have expected from 
Madison’s close reading of Hume.”233  In the end, the Constitution 
“enshrined an argumentative process in which no such thing as a last 
word would ever be uttered”234 more than it ordained fixed, immutable 
traditions.  That should be music to the ears of humble lawyers like 
ourselves. 
C. Hint #3: Ask the Right People for Validation 
But we are not listening, either to the Scots or to the Framers who 
learned from them.  While the Court will sometimes express the process 
orientation of the Constitution’s treatment of rights,235 it continues to fear 
accepting that rights are not transcendent things that can be cast in the 
amber of tradition.  To a degree, their fear is understandable, however, 
because the Court’s internal critics of this view have not provided a 
reasonable alternative approach to the one currently in use. 
Justice Brennan, for example, has dissented from the traditions 
analysis in terms faithful to Hume and Smith.  Using traditions, he says, 
makes the Constitution “not the living charter that I have taken [it to 
be],” but renders it “instead a stagnant, archaic, hidebound document 
steeped in the prejudices and superstitions of a time long past.”236  Justice 
Harlan was also inspired in Poe v. Ullman when he argued that liberty is 
not a series of isolated points pricked out in terms of the taking of 
property; the freedom of speech, press, and religion; the right to keep 
and bear arms; the freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures; 
and so on.  It is a rational continuum which, broadly speaking, includes  
 
                                                     
 233. WILLS, supra note 3, at 54. 
 234. ELLIS, supra note 140, at 125. 
 235. See passages quoted in PECK, supra note 8, at 172–73.  A good example of this expression 
is in United States v. Classic: 
[I]n determining whether a provision of the Constitution applies to a new subject matter, 
it is of little significance that it is one with which the framers were not familiar.  For in 
setting up an enduring framework of government they undertook to carry out for the 
indefinite future and in all the vicissitudes of the changing affairs of men, those 
fundamental purposes which the instrument itself discloses. 
319 U.S. 299, 316 (1941). 
 236. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 141 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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a freedom from all substantial arbitrary impositions and purposeless 
restraints . . . .237 
But neither Justice could describe how to find the soul of that “living 
charter” or the content of that “continuum” without resort to the same, 
unprincipled process the majority ultimately used to subjectively pick a 
tradition or find a penumbra.238 
Indeed, no one has suggested an effective alternative to date.  This 
initial expedition into the problem, however, suggests that the Scots laid 
out two principles that should be the focus of further research into an 
answer.  First, the Scots would advise that the ultimate arbiter of whether 
the Court is answering the rights question properly is not the Court itself, 
the word “Supreme” in its title notwithstanding.  Justice Harlan sensed 
this in Poe when he said that the object of constitutional interpretation is 
“the balance which our Nation . . . has struck between . . . liberty and the 
demands of organized society,”239 a balance “this country” strikes by 
being mindful of “the traditions from which it developed as well as the 
traditions from which it broke.”240  But Justice Harlan suggests that the 
“country” that ultimately strikes this balance is, as the Scots knew, the 
deep-seated consensus of the citizenry itself.  A “decision of this Court 
which radically departs from [that balance] could not long survive,” he 
warns, “while a decision which builds on what has survived is likely to 
be sound.”241  Democracy at its most principled and considered level 
provides the final validation.242 
A proper interpretation of the rights question thus depends on the 
Court’s ability to grasp this fundamental consensus of the people.  
Hamilton spoke of it in Federalist No. 1, where he said: 
                                                     
 237. 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).  I have discussed Harlan’s opinion 
extensively in my article Saving Probable Cause, wherein I also noted the extensive and thoughtful 
analysis of it given by my colleague, Professor Bruce Ledewitz.  Antkowiak, supra note 74, at 601–
06. 
 238. Harlan truly disappoints in this respect, for he ends up proposing little more than his own 
version of a traditions analysis as his guide.  Rights are to be assessed “as they have been rationally 
perceived and historically developed.”  Poe, 367 U.S. at 544.  Whether a new claim passes muster 
“must depend on grounds which follow closely on well-accepted principles and criteria” and must 
arise from “considerations deeply rooted in reason and in the compelling traditions of the legal 
profession.”  Id. at 544–45.  Using this approach, Harlan opines that laws banning private, adult, 
consensual sex would probably continue to be constitutional.  Id. at 552–53. 
 239. Id. at 542. 
 240. Id. 
 241. Id. 
 242. See generally Bruce Ledewitz, Justice Harlan’s Law and Democracy, 20 J.L. & POL. 373 
(2004) (explaining Justice Harlan’s idea of democracy as a way of self-correcting judicial decisions). 
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[I]t seems to have been reserved to the people of this country, by their 
conduct and example, to decide the important question, whether 
societies of men are really capable or not of establishing good 
government from reflection and choice, or whether they are forever 
destined to depend for their political constitutions on accident and 
force.243 
It is the essence of the rhetorical question of the Anti-Federalists: “‘What 
is the usefulness of a truth in theory . . . unless it exists constantly in the 
minds of the people, and has their assent?’”244  It is Hume’s “evolving 
conventions” and it is the product of Smith’s spectatorial process.  It is, 
perhaps, what the Court would find if it found an honorable way to 
appreciate the conscience of the people and know the practices that “our 
polity will not endure.”245 
The Scots may help in finding that way as well.  Once the Court 
recognizes where the ultimate validation of its efforts to answer the 
rights question lies, it will know that a new kind of judging is needed.  
The new judging will require the Court to abandon its failed efforts to 
speak of rights as transcendent things in terms no political institution can 
articulate with integrity.  Once the Court begins to speak like lawyers 
again, and shifts its focus from parsing about what level of traditions is 
the valid measure of human rights, it can focus on understanding that 
deep consensus upon which a constitutional process that can assure a 
meaningful measure of respect for the people is based.  To this end, the 
Scots would not advise that the Court just wait for the Congress to 
propose new Amendments.  While the last, best hope for individual 
liberty will always lie with the body of the people themselves, on a day 
to day basis, the Court has an obligation to try to get it right. 
The new judging may test if Smith was correct that courts not only 
could use the impartial spectator process to do justice but that they were 
the best venue for it.246  It may require contemplating if the processes 
John Rawls speaks of for rulemaking in a well-ordered society—
processes that seem to incorporate Smith’s ideas—are viable, as I have 
suggested they are in another context.247  Whatever form it takes, the 
effort to grasp that consensus will respect the words of the Constitution 
and give the Court a foundation upon which to interpret them consistent 
                                                     
 243. THE FEDERALIST NO. 1, at 33 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
 244. RAKOVE, supra note 136, at 323 (emphasis added). 
 245. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 328 (1937), overruled by Benton v. Maryland, 395 
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with the rule of law.  It will allow our ancestors to vote248 by examining 
the efficacy of their efforts to achieve the same sublime paradox we seek, 
always cognizant, however, that we live in the dynamic context of a 
world very different from theirs. 
This effort will require some profoundly inspirational voices.  On a 
visit to Monticello, Hamilton once supposedly asked Jefferson to identify 
the men in the three portraits proudly displayed in the hall.249  They were, 
Jefferson replied, the three greatest men who ever lived: Francis Bacon, 
Isaac Newton and John Locke.250  Hamilton shrugged.  The greatest man 
who ever lived, he said, was Julius Caesar.251  It matters who inspires us.  
As the project of addressing the “rights question” continues, we all need 
to ask whose portraits hang on our walls.  Perhaps they should be 
portraits of people who have a history of inspiring the American 
constitutional experiment.  Perhaps they are people who just might lead 
us home today.  
 
                                                     
 248. G.K. Chesterton said: “Tradition means giving votes to the most obscure of all classes, our 
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ORTHODOXY 85 (Greenwood Press 1974) (1908). 
 249. ADAIR, supra note 142, at 13. 
 250. Id. 
 251. Id. 
